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ABSTRACT 
Swarming concepts and swarm tactics have been used for centuries.  Swarming is 
essentially a convergent attack on an adversary from multiple axes.  Swarming attacks are 
usually conducted either by force or fire, or a combination of both.  Swarming is not new 
to military scholars and historians, but the idea of formally incorporating swarming 
concepts into military doctrine and tactics by the Marine Corps and other U.S. armed 
forces has never been given serious thought beyond limited experimentation.  The most 
recent and relevant use of swarm tactics occurred during the Chechen Wars against the 
Russians, which have proved a serious challenge to the Russians.  When one examines 
Marine Corps doctrine, warfighting concepts and experiments, a doctrinal void emerges 
that should truly be addressed.  The Marine Corps distributed operations (DO) concept is 
reviewed with the idea of contributing toward a future swarming doctrine.  While we 
watched the Chechen Wars unfold, even writing articles and books about all the lessons 
we should have learned, none of those lessons related to swarming ever translated into 
real doctrinal changes, embracing both offense and defense.  This thesis asks if there is 
potential to develop doctrinal swarming concepts, while bringing forth additional lessons 
learned from the Chechen Wars and highlighting gaps and weaknesses in warfighting 
doctrinal publications and warfighting experiments. 
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I think that the American people need to understand that, and that we as a 
nation need to understand that as we look at what are our vital interests 
and what aren't our vital interests, and understanding that whatever our 
interests are going to be, it is going to eventually lead us into what we call 
the three- block war.  Why?  Because they've watched CNN, the enemy 
has. They've seen the might of our technology. They're not going to fight 
us straight up. We're not going to see the son of Desert Storm anymore. 
You're going to see the stepchild of Chechnya.   
--Gen. Charles Krulak, USMC1 
A. PURPOSE 
In the Global War on Terror (GWOT), U.S. forces are aggressively seeking new 
ways to increase our effectiveness against insurgents, terror networks and other 
unconventional adversaries.  All this while striving to retain a superior conventional 
armed force.  Despite the renewed emphasis on counterinsurgency, our conventional 
forces are still using doctrine and tactics based on conventional maneuver warfare, not 
much on irregular or guerrilla warfare, and this may be giving our enemies some distinct 
tactical and operational advantages.  We are using to a great extent our special operations 
forces (SOF) in both traditional and non-traditional ways, but in combat zones dominated 
by indigenous and conventional U.S. forces, there are limited opportunities for strategic 
impact using the typical environment SOF are used to operating in.  As the services 
search for ways to give our forces asymmetrical advantages against our enemies, the 
adoption of swarming concepts by ground forces2 may be another way our forces can 
become more lethal to our enemies while providing protection when swarming tactics are 
used upon us.  Swarming was briefly looked at for use by ground forces in late 1990s 
                                                 
1 General Charles Krulak, interview by Jim Lehrer, Online Newshour:  Gen. Krulak -- 25 June 1999, 
PBS, Located at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june99/krulak_6-25.html.  Retrieved on 28 
April 2008.  The “three-block war” notion above was coined by Gen. Krulak.  At the time, Gen. Krulak 
was the Commandant of the Marine Corps.  It means that in today’s urban battle, we could conceivably be 
providing humanitarian assistance on one block, peacekeeping or peace enforcement on the next, and 
combat operations on the next block. 
2 Ground forces who might conceivably use swarm tactics may be supported by air and naval fires. 
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during Marine Corps warfighting experiments3; and the purpose of this thesis is to 
examine whether there is potential to formalize concepts of swarming into doctrine for 
use by special and/or conventional operations forces.  Numerous authors over the years 
have documented historical examples of belligerents utilizing swarm tactics, and several 
authors have recently pointed to the need to evolve concepts of swarming into formal 
doctrine. 
To examine the concept in greater detail, this thesis will take an in-depth look at 
the use of swarming during the Chechen Wars.  Additionally, this thesis will examine 
current and emerging doctrine and warfighting concepts to assess their effectiveness in 
countering swarm tactics, and the gaps this doctrinal void leaves, while evaluating the 
potential for our forces to use swarming offensively.  It will identify variables which 
contributed to swarming’s success or failure, both offensively and defensively, over the 
course of the Chechen Wars.  Ultimately, this thesis will evaluate the potential for 
incorporating swarming concepts into doctrine for use by ground forces, both 
conventional and special operations types.  History has shown that swarming has been 
employed by many types of forces, often achieving tactical and operational victories for 
those forces that have used them.  If it can be shown that there is potential to develop a 
swarming doctrine by our forces, it will improve the effectiveness of U.S. forces engaged 
in both conventional and irregular wars, and thus perhaps fill a doctrinal void. 
B. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Is there potential to turn swarming concepts into doctrine for U.S. forces?  In 
order to answer this question, this thesis will ask the following questions: 
• Are there relevant historical precedents that provide sufficient analysis to 
explore development of swarming concepts?  
• Does the concept of swarming address any gaps in military doctrine? 
 
 
                                                 
3 Especially the Hunter Warrior advanced warfighting experiment and the Project Metropolis series of 
advanced warfighting experiments.  These experiments will be covered more in Chapter III . 
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• Can we [U.S. forces, and more specifically, Marines] incorporate swarm 
tactics into our doctrine for use in the offense and defense without drastic 
changes to organization, command, control and communications (C3), 
training, and logistics? 
The methodology for this study is discussed later in this chapter, but it will follow 
the basic organizational construct by answering the three questions above.  But before we 
dive into the Chechen Wars, swarming needs to be defined and differentiated from other 
seemingly similar types of warfare. 
C. WHAT IS SWARMING? 
While there are historical cases of swarm tactics used by militaries of the past, 
swarming is first and foremost associated with bees, wasps and other flying insects.  John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt defined military swarming as “the systematic pulsing of 
force and/or fire by dispersed, internetted units, so as to strike the adversary from all 
directions simultaneously.”4  They differentiate swarms from the other traditional forms 
of battle, such as mass and maneuver, by focusing on what the information age has 
enabled us to do with our forces.5  Sean Edwards in his doctoral dissertation states that 
“Swarming occurs when several units conduct a convergent attack on a target from 
multiple axes.  Attacks can either be long range fires or close range fire and hit-and-run 
attacks.”6  According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, swarming has two fundamental 
requirements, namely the ability to strike the enemy from multiple directions and that the 
swarming force be “part of a ‘sensory organization’”, providing intelligence to other 
members of the force and the higher echelon units.7  History is replete with examples of 
forces using swarm tactics against their adversaries, so for one to think that swarming is a 
completely new concept is not altogether true. 
                                                 
4 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.  Swarming & the Future of Conflict.  Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, 
2000), 8. 
5 Ibid., 8-9. 
6 Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming and the Future of Warfare.  (Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, 2005), xvii. 
7 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.  Swarming & the Future of Conflict, (Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, 
2000), 22. 
 4
D. SWARMING EXAMPLES IN HISTORY 
For hundreds of years, various military, insurgent, and guerrilla forces have used 
swarming tactics with both success and failure against their adversaries.  While this thesis 
devotes an entire chapter looking at the swarm during the First and Second Chechen 
Wars, below are a few examples of times when forces have used the swarm to their 
advantage. 
1. The Mongol Swarm 
There have been few historical military forces so menacing to their enemies as 
were the Mongols under Genghis Khan.  The Mongols’ superior weaponry and mobility, 
combined with a decentralized command and control, were key enablers to swarming.8  
The Mongols’ doctrine and training espoused the concept of swarming and it became a 
signature tactic of the Mongol attack that few adversaries could defend against or repel.9  
Edwards points out that “Mongol success depended on having terrain on which to 
maneuver.  Generally, when the horsemen could swarm around the enemy, they won; 
when they could be channeled, they lost.”10 
One of the signature swarm tactics used by the Mongols was “the mangudai, or 
“feigned withdrawal” ruse.11  In this tactic, the Mongols would use light cavalry in a fake 
attack directly at the enemy’s front.  Then, the Mongol light cavalry would halt and run 
away, misleading the enemy into thinking the Mongols were retreating when in fact they 
would be leading their pursuers into an trap.  Sometimes they would retreat for days, until 




                                                 
8 Sean J. A. Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future, (RAND, Santa Monica: 
2000), 28-29. 
9 Ibid., 28-31. 
10 Ibid., 30. 
11 Ibid., 29. 
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lead the enemies into a draw of some sort in which the light cavalry would suddenly turn 
around and the heavy cavalry, waiting above on all sides, would swarm the enemy with 
fire and force.12 
Jack Weatherford describes another Mongol tactic, called the “Crow Swarm or 
Falling Stars attack.”13 In this swarm attack, the Mongols would, “At the signal of a 
drum, or by fire at night, the horsemen came galloping from all directions at once.”14  As 
to the effects of the Crow Swarm on the Mongol’s enemies, Weatherford states  
The enemy was shaken and unnerved by the sudden assault and equally 
sudden disappearance, the roaring wave of noise followed by a greater 
silence.  Before they would respond properly to the attack, the Mongols 
were gone and left the enemy bleeding and confused.15  
From one empire that used the swarm to conquer the modern world, to one that 
was forced to retreat in fear, next we’ll see how the great Emperor Napoleon was forced 
to ever watch from all directions as he retreated from Russia. 
2. Napoleon’s Retreat from Russia 
When Napoleon entered the uninhabited and burning Russian capital of Moscow 
after the Battle of Borodino, it marked the beginning of the end for one of the greatest 
military commanders of all time.  The Russian peasants and Cossacks, led by men such 
as Lieutenant Colonel Denis Davydov, used swarming tactics to harass, terrorize, and 
wear down Napoleon’s forces, logistics trains, and rear guards.16  Eugene Tarle provides 
a great account of how a Cossack swarm almost cost Napoleon his life: 
                                                 
12 This paragraph is fused from two sources.  See Sean J.A. Edwards’s two works: Swarming on the 
Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000) pp 28-31 and “Swarming and the 
Future of Warfare”, PhD diss., Pardee RAND Graduate School, 2004, 214. 
13 Jack Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World, (New York:  Three Rivers 
Press, 2004), 94. 
14 Ibid., 94.  
15 Ibid., 94. 
16 Eugene Tarle, Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia: 1812, (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), 268, 346, 
350. 
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On 25 October, at daybreak, the Emperor rode to Maloyaroslavets.  With 
him a small retinue: Marshal Berthier, General Rapp, and a number of 
officers.  Suddenly a detachment of Cossacks came galloping with their 
pikes atilt, heading straight for Napoleon and his retinue.  With shouts of 
‘Hurrah!’ they charged in the small group of mounted men.  Their shouts 
saved Napoleon from death or capture: his retinue had not recognized the 
horsemen in the distance and took the Cossacks for a squadron of French 
cavalry.  But on hearing the characteristic ‘hurrah,’ the retinue of about 25 
officers clustered around the Emperor.  One Cossack managed to swoop 
down on General Rapp, piercing his horse with his pike, but two French 
squadrons arrived in time to throw back the Cossacks, who quickly 
vanished in the woods taking with them a few French artillery horses and 
disorganizing a part of the French camp along the way.17  
3. The Winter War 
In another, more modern instance of swarming, the Finns under the command of 
Marshal Mannerheim utilized swarming tactics at the initial stages of the Soviet invasion, 
much to the Soviets’ dismay.  While the Soviet propaganda machine was proclaiming 
Red Army successes from the onset of hostilities18, Mannerheim’s numerically inferior 
forces did enjoy limited success against the Soviets, using swarming tactics against the 
Red Army’s conventional forces.  One example of swarming tactics was in the Finnish 
motti.19  William Trotter, in his book A Frozen Hell, provides examples of swarm tactics 
used against Soviet forces.  Trotter states: “A textbook motti had three phases: 
 
 
                                                 
17 Eugene Tarle, Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia: 1812, (New York: Octagon Books, 1971),, 338. 
18 See James Venceslav Anzulovic, “The Russian Record of the Winter War, 193901940: An 
Analytical Study of Soviet Records of the War with Finland from 30 November 1939 to 12 March 1940”, 
PhD Dissertation, University of Maryland, 1968.  In his dissertation, it is replete with Soviet propaganda 
about their success in the first push into Finland.  The truth, however, was very different, especially for the 
Soviet troops in the north. 
19 While not widely studied today, the motti was in-effect swarming the enemy by force and/or fires, 
but usually both.  The website www.winterwar.com by Sami H.E. Korhonen provides abundant 
information about the Winter War.  Sami uses original Finnish journals and texts, as well as a few 
translated books.  It is an excellent way to gain an understanding of various parts of the battle very quickly.  
Sami defines motti as “a surrounded/encircled military unit or a place, where that unit is 
surrounded/encircled.” (found on http://www.winterwar.com/Tactics/mottis.htm).  Sami also describes in 
detail the Finnish Anti-tank teams that attained operational level effects against the Soviet armor. 
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1. Reconnaissance…and encirclement…to pin the enemy… 
2. Quick, sharp attacks, using concentration of force…delivered at vulnerable 
points along the entire length of the column…isolated fragments. 
3. Detailed destruction of each pocket…”20 
Finnish tactics could be described by “Individual and small-unit initiative, expert 
camouflage…quick concentration and quick dispersal, the technique of large-scale as 
well as small-unit ambushes,” all of which facilitated the Finns’ ability to swarm Soviet 
forces, which were doctrinally deployed to fight a conventional battle.  One of many 
examples at the Battle of Suomussalmi exemplifies the Finnish use of swarming when, 
after the initial motti; the Finnish forces exploited the breach in the Soviet column by 
immediately swarming the Soviets from the tree line and widening the gap by fire and 
force.21 
The Finns fiercely resisted the Soviet advance, and historians have recognized the 
asymmetrical advantage the guerrilla units enjoyed against their bulky and slow moving 
adversary.  Engle and Paananen note that “Guerrilla fighting began in earnest almost 
from the moment of the Russian onslaught as white-clad ski patrols raced up and down 
the tracks harassing the enemy columns.”22  Similar to what Edwards might classify as a 
vapor swarm, the Finnish guerrillas “Using their quick-firing Suomi submachine guns, 
the skiers appeared out of nowhere, poured a deluge of bullets into the Russian masses, 
and then disappeared into the whiteness again.”23  Mannerheim obviously saw the value 
that these guerrillas and their swarm tactics bore on their Soviet enemy.  He dispatched 
units throughout the north, harassing the Soviets from the flanks and rear, with complete 
autonomy to develop the situation as they saw fitting.24  They almost always attacked 
                                                 
20 William Trotter, A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940, (Chappell Hill:  
Algonquin Books, 1991), 131. 
21 William Trotter, A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940, (Chappell Hill:  
Algonquin Books, 1991), 156. 
22 Eloise Engle & Lauri Paananen, The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939-1940, 
(Mechanicsburg, PA:  Stackpole Books, 1973), 16-18. 
23 Ibid., 18. 
24 Ibid., 36. 
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with surprise, as they did not have the artillery preparatory fires, and would “strike in the 
dark or during snowstorms and fog.”25  Engle and Paananen note that the Finns had two 
organized guerrilla battalions, but the command and control was such that the guerrillas 
deployed as small groups and even solo if the situation demanded.26  These small groups, 
using techniques like the motti and the other swarm tactics, didn’t defeat the Soviet 
invaders, but cost them dearly.  But the Winter War wasn’t the last time the Soviets 
would face swarms. 
4. The Soviet Afghan War 
While not before documented in previous literature on swarming, there seems to 
be more evidence that the mujahideen may have used swarm tactics to repel the Soviets 
during the Soviet Afghan War.  For instance, when the mujahideen attacked convoys, 
they used tactics similar to the motti used by the Finns in the Winter War.  H. John Poole 
states, 
To maximize surprise, the mujahideen would often attack a whole convoy 
at once.  Sometimes that meant spreading tiny teams over a distance of 5-7 
kilometers…Picture RPG teams digging spider holes beside a road at the 
same interval that trucks doctrinally maintain.  By popping up at once, 
those two-man teams could have done some real damage.27 
Poole notes that after this 360-degree ambush, the mujahideen would withdraw, 
but could reuse those same positions time and time again.28  A successful ‘swarm by fire’ 
ambush was executed in October 1980 against an entire Soviet convoy near Abdullah-E 
Burj, as the convoy crossed the bridge.29  By coordinated signal, the mujahideen 
simultaneously launched rocket fires on the convoy, then as the convoy went into chaos, 
                                                 
25 Eloise Engle & Lauri Paananen, The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939-1940, 
(Mechanicsburg, PA:  Stackpole Books, 1973), 36. 
26Ibid., 86, 108, 110. 
27 H. John Poole, Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods (Emerald Isle, NC:  
Posterity Press, 2004), 99. 
28 Ibid., 99-100. 
29 Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, Eds.  The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in 
the Soviet-Afghan War (Fort Leavenworth:  Foreign Military Studies Office, 1995) in an article by Haji 
Abdul Qader and Haji Qasab, “Ambush Near Abdullah-E Burj”, 30-33. 
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they continued rocket fire and added medium and small arms fires.30  Shortly thereafter, 
the mujahideen were able to withdraw safely with negligible losses. 
These examples provide a brief description of swarm tactics that have been 
employed.  While not always used by guerrilla forces, these irregular tactics; employed as 
an evolution from maneuver warfare, share some common traits with guerrilla-type 
warfare and emerging concepts such as Distributed Operations, yet it is different. 
E. WHAT DIFFERENTIATES SWARMING FROM GUERRILLA 
WARFARE AND EMERGING DOCTRINE IN DISTRIBUTED 
OPERATIONS? 
With respect to guerrilla warfare, swarming may at first seem very similar.  
However, there are some distinct differences between the two.  First, guerrilla warfare is 
typically conducted as a means to a political/revolutionary end, usually by an inferior 
force.31  Second, guerrilla warfare ambushes and hit-and-run tactics are usually executed 
by one or two small units, who quickly disperse because they lack the fires and/or forces 
necessary to close with and destroy the enemy.32  In swarming, one relies on multiple 
small, highly mobile, and networked forces, which can attack, withdraw, and re-attack 
(pulsing) if required or desired by the commander.33  In swarming, the swarm force does 
not necessarily have to be the weaker force as typified by guerrilla warfare.  But, even if 
weaker it can rely on larger aggregate attack fires than in guerrilla warfare.  Thus, there 
are distinct differences between a swarm force and that of guerrilla forces, yet guerrilla 
forces have and will continue to use swarming tactics against their adversaries.  The latest 
warfighting concept to emerge of late is the Marine Corps’ notion of distributed 
operations (DO).   
                                                 
30Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, Eds.  The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in 
the Soviet-Afghan War (Fort Leavenworth:  Foreign Military Studies Office, 1995) in an article by Haji 
Abdul Qader and Haji Qasab, “Ambush Near Abdullah-E Burj”, 30-33 
31 Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming and the Future of Warfare.  (Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, 2005), 63-
65, 68. 
32 Ibid., 63-65, 68. 
33 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.  Swarming & the Future of Conflict.  (Santa Monica, CA:  
RAND, 2000), 46. 
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Distributed operations though, as we’ll discuss in here, are not swarming in the sense 
described here or anywhere else, but rather an extension of maneuver warfare and will be an 
organic capability to the infantry battalions once implementation is complete.  The Marine 
Corps’ defines DO as “a technique applied to an appropriate situation wherein units are 
separated beyond the limits of mutual support.”34  BGen Robert Schmidle defined DO as: 
Distributed Operations are characterized by the physical dispersion of 
networked units over an extended battlespace.  Battalion to squad-sized 
formations can conduct such operations.  These operations avoid linear, 
sequential, and predictable operations.  They afford the commander a means 
for addressing ambiguity and uncertainty in the battlespace environment.  
Distributed forces present a complex puzzle to the adversary.35 
The basic premise of DO is to extend the battlespace through dispersed units of 
smaller than battalion size.  To affect this, the Corps is training and equipping companies and 
platoons to operate in areas of operation that would have normally been assigned to higher 
echelons such as battalions.  This isn’t really anything above what the Corps thinks every 
infantry battalion needs.  In fact, by the time predeployment workups are complete, every 
infantry battalion should have the tools required to conduct DO.  But in relation to swarming 
or other new warfighting concepts, the tactics are still based on conventional operations, 
grounded in maneuver warfare and utilizing both established and new combat-tested36 
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).  Swarming of forces at the operational or tactical 
level is not part of the plan in DO. 
Retired Marine Colonel Vincent Goulding is one of the originators of the DO 
concept.  In personal interviews with the author and in publications, Col. Goulding 
asserts that DO is “an additive capability,”37 and that “DO is maneuver warfare.”38  He 
                                                 
34 U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment.  
(Washington, D.C: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2007), 106. 
35 Robert E. Schmidle, “Distributed Operations:  From the Sea,” Marine Corps Gazette, 88, 7, July 
2004, 37-38. 
36 From lessons learned coming out of combat and DO experiments. 
37 Vincent J. Goulding Jr., “DO:  More than Two Words,” Marine Corps Gazette, 91, 2, February 
2007, 51.  Col. Goulding and the author met in October 2007 to discuss DO and swarming. 
38 Vincent J. Goulding Jr., “DO:  More than Two Words,” Marine Corps Gazette, 91, 2, February 
2007, 51. 
 11
insists that DO “would not compromise the fundamental ability of Marine infantry units 
to accomplish traditional missions.”39  Indeed, despite the all the rhetoric that has 
surrounded DO for several years, it has really come down to manpower, training and 
education, and equipment.40  So regardless of the hoopla surrounding any new whiz-bang 
or swarming forces under the mask of DO, it really comes down to proper staffing, 
education, training and fielding of the right equipment to enable infantry battalions to 
employ across a much larger battlespace.41  Col. Goulding writes: 
These training and equipment initiatives will significantly increase overall 
combat effectiveness and, as a result, enable tactical formations to 
decentralize their operations more effectively.  In a nutshell, DO is the 
product of scrupulously close attention to “brilliance in the basics,” which 
then opens the door for higher level of ground combat excellence.  DO is 
squarely aimed at aligning the Corps’ conventional capabilities closer to 
the realities of current and future military operations.42 
The confusion from many warfighters when it comes to DO, I think, stems from 
BGen. Schmidle’s article.  While the published information and articles on DO from Col. 
Goulding remain focused on manning, training, and equipping the infantry battalion, one 
gets the impression that DO is an altogether new warfighting concept not unlike 
swarming from the general’s article.  To make this point, the following excerpts are from 
BGen. Schmidle’s article: 
• “By increasing the ability to simultaneously attack in many directions with 
all forms of fires and maneuver, distributed operations create continuous 
pressure on the opponent and lead to his psychological dislocation rather 
than physical destruction and attrition.”43 
                                                 
39 Vincent J. Goulding Jr., “DO:  More than Two Words,” Marine Corps Gazette, 91, 2, February 
2007, 51. 
40 Ibid., 51-53. 
41 The author reviewed over 20 Marine Corps Gazette and Leatherneck articles in researching this 
thesis and the topic of DO.  They will be listed in the bibliography.   
42 Vincent J. Goulding, “Distributed Operations:  What’s not to Like,” Marine Corps Gazette, 91, 2, 
February 2007, 51. 
43 Robert E. Schmidle, “Distributed Operations:  From the Sea,” Marine Corps Gazette, 88, 7, July 
2004, 38. 
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• “Distributed operations…are used to accomplish three basic tasks:”44 
1. “persistent and actionable intelligence by maintaining observation over 
designated objectives or personnel.”45 
2. “used for battlespace shaping or as a screening force.”46 
3. “used to call precise fires on targets.”47 
• “Distributed operations…capability…  [for the teams to] disperse and 
reaggregate seamlessly based on the tactical situation and nature of the 
terrain.”48 
• “Swarming across the dispersed battlefield may trigger the opponent to try 
to mass his defensive forces.’49 
It may be for these vary reasons that some students of Marine Corps warfighting 
concepts may confuse DO with something it is not.  If one were to only take DO in the 
framework above, there is very little to differentiate it from swarming concepts as we 
know them.  The direction for DO that is currently being disseminated around the Marine 
Corps is that which has been published by Col. Goulding.  This is not to say that by 
manning, training, and equipping the Corps’ infantry battalions that they cannot do those 
tasks listed above, as they in fact can, and in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, have.  
Therefore, it is imperative for this research here that we remain attentive to those tenets 
of swarming promulgated by Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Edwards, but keep in the back of 
our minds this short discussion on DO.   
F. IMPORTANCE 
During Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2) in Afghanistan, 11 SOF 
Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams working with the indigenous population 
and other existing anti-Taliban insurgents, (such as the Northern Alliance), enjoyed great 
                                                 
44 Robert E. Schmidle, “Distributed Operations:  From the Sea,” Marine Corps Gazette, 88, 7, July 
2004, 38. 
45 Ibid., 38. 
46 Ibid., 38. 
47 Ibid., 38. 
48 Ibid., 38-39. 
49 Ibid., 39. 
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success.  However, in operations since in both Iraq and Afghanistan, conventional forces 
are still all too often using conventional maneuver warfare to engage insurgents and 
guerrilla fighters who have become familiar with our doctrine and tactics (similar to what 
happened to the Soviets in the Soviet-Afghan War).50  In tactical engagements, we 
routinely have the upper hand with firepower and force, however, we are not defeating 
the enemy in such a way that he is deterred from engaging U.S. forces again or placed in 
the horns of a dilemma...the operational and strategic victory is out of our grasp.  
Meanwhile, recent examples of swarming tactics against conventional military forces 
have often proven successful.  More recently, the use of swarming tactics has occurred 
during tactical engagements in both Iraq and Afghanistan, pitting the swarm against both 
sides, suggesting that it has been used by and against conventional U.S. forces.  This 
trend should be of importance to service doctrinal advocates, operational commanders 
and the training establishment.    
Swarming tactics are not new to scholars of warfare, but the employment of 
swarming tactics under specific conditions has proven extremely successful, with the end 
result sometimes being second and third order effects on strategy and policy.  The U.S. 
military’s current doctrine for fighting both conventional and unconventional adversaries 
does have gaps that, if filled, could increase the lethality and overall effectiveness of our 
ground forces.  Despite a few historical precedents and experimentation, the use of 
swarm tactics by ground forces has generally been avoided, while there has been 
considerable excitement over the use of swarming with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs).  By limiting swarm tactics to UAVs and other airborne Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, we are not fully exploiting tactics that 
might present an edge to our forces under certain conditions.  While there is evidence that 
both insurgent and U.S. forces have used swarm tactics, swarming concepts and swarm 
tactics have failed to take hold at the service level or to be embraced as a doctrinal 
concept.  This problem is partially centered in doctrine and training, as our stove-piped 
hierarchical structure is resistant to change.   
                                                 
50 Discussions with Prof. John Arquilla revealed that “while the campaign in Afghanistan has waxed 
and waned, with swarming sometimes coming to the fore, sometimes receding.” 
 14
On the battlefield, our Marines and soldiers are producing significantly favorable 
exchange ratios and achieving tactical victories, but doctrinal tactics are still grounded in 
conventional warfare when we have the resources (manpower, technologies) to exploit 
swarming concepts.  Some may say that conventional forces are ill-prepared to fight 
irregular warfare, especially using tactics such as the swarm.  We lack a doctrinal based 
defense against the swarm when it is used against us, nor do we have any formal school 
that teaches swarming tactics to our infantry, yet there is testimony that our conventional 
and special forces using swarming tactics and defending against (or repelling) the 
swarm.51  U.S. SOF are the only U.S. forces trained to conduct irregular warfare, but 
swarm tactics present new challenges even for those trained in asymmetrical warfare.  
There is no better time to add new capabilities to our conventional forces and SOFs than 
the present.  Steven Metz notes “the U.S. effort in Iraq has had a number of problems.  
We used flawed strategic assumptions, did not plan adequately, and had a doctrinal 
void.”52  This doctrinal void has been partially addressed with updated field manuals, 
new doctrinal publications and advanced warfighting concepts.  However, training 
conventional forces to use unconventional tactics has not been seriously considered.  Yet 
in reality, this is already happening on the battlefield.  Fighting insurgencies and guerrilla 
wars with conventional forces has never been easy, but not impossible.  The U.S.’s track 
record from Vietnam, Somalia, and the Iraq clearly shows that we have had difficulties in 
fighting insurgencies, even with SOF augmentation to those conventional forces.  
The importance of all this is two-fold.  First, we must learn and study swarm 
tactics so that we are better able to defend against the swarm and concurrently turn the 
swarm to our advantage and use it on the offensive.  Second, by studying swarming 
concepts, we can apply the concepts to our SOF and conventional forces evaluating the 
potential to formally adopt these concepts for use against both our conventional and 
                                                 
51 There are several reports of the use of swarm tactics by U.S. forces and by U.S. forces in Operations 
Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.  The author spoke with one U.S. Army infantry officer and two 
Special Forces (SF) officers (one Army SF and one Navy Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) team commanders) 
who all employed swarm type tactics in combat.  Sean Edwards, in his doctoral dissertation previously 
cited, also mentions the use of swarm tactics.  For more, see Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming and the Future 
of Warfare,  (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005), 280-285. 
52 Steven Metz, . Learning from Iraq:  Counterinsurgency in American Strategy.  (Carlisle, PA:  
Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), vii. 
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unconventional enemies.  I believe the uses of swarm tactics by the Chechens is an 
extremely relevant example.  Furthermore, the fact that the Russians were able to 
eventually cope with the swarm during the 2nd Chechen War makes the study of both 
Chechen Wars extremely important to this argument.  We will discuss the Chechen Wars 
in depth in Chapter two. 
G. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The literature associated with the topic is separated into three areas.  These three 
areas are 1) swarming literature and historical examples, 2) literature on the Chechen 
Wars, and 3) military doctrine, concepts and warfighting experiments.  The literature 
review will identify if there are gaps in our knowledge that we hope to answer, provide a 
departure point for further existing work, and set the foundation for analysis and 
validation of the argument. 
1. Swarming Literature  
Most literature on swarming is focused in four areas: anthropology (human social 
swarming); entomology (insect swarms), technology and advanced research (computers, 
modeling and simulation, robotics, and reconnaissance and surveillance); and military 
applications of swarming concepts with ground forces.  While all three areas can 
contribute to this research question, the battlefield swarming concepts are most relevant 
to the question we are trying to answer here.  There are three publications that provide the 
most important literature for framing the concept of swarming.  
Edwards’s study titled Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future 
(RAND, 2000) provides a brief examination of ten battles/campaigns conducted over the 
last two thousand years.  In doing so, Edwards gives us a good starting point for more 
rigorous research into swarm tactics.  He provides evidentiary conclusions on conditions 
for success and failure of swarming forces upon which to start further analytical research.  
Sean Edwards framed the conditions for victory and defeat for those battles he studied.  
Edwards broaches the subject of doctrinal swarming, briefly examining tactics, logistics, 
command and organization, and technology, and helping frame those as variables in other 
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works and this thesis’ deeper analysis of the Chechen Wars.  The second work on 
swarming tactics takes this study into full account, compliments it, and introduces the 
notional concept of ‘battleswarm’.  
Authors John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, who originated the concept of 
swarming in 21st century conflict in the publication titled Swarming & the Future of 
Conflict (RAND, 2000), provide an introduction to the concept of swarming.  This 
document’s underlying theme is that swarming is the fourth basic form of warfare53 and 
adopting a swarming doctrine would require changes across all the military services.  
Their main argument is that “the rise of advanced information operations will bring 
swarming to the forefront, establishing a new pattern in conflict.”54  This concept paper is 
truly insightful in its thinking.  Not meant to be a comprehensive document, but more of 
an “ice breaker” on the concept, there are many points of departure that the authors 
identify as yet to be fully explored. 
The focus of the paper is the means of delivering swarm tactics, which they 
ground in the transformation of conventional military forces and reliance on joint task 
forces in execution.  Arquilla and Ronfeldt highlight several areas in which further 
research and experimentation would need to be done.  These areas are: 
• “Building a fully integrated surveillance and communication 
system in support of swarm forces 
• Command and Control 
• Logistics 
• Organizational Structure 
• Doctrine & Training 
• Manpower and Equipment 
• Residual effects to remainder of the force.”55 
                                                 
53 Arquilla and Ronfeldt make the case that swarming is the next evolution in warfare, moving beyond 
the confines of maneuver.  They state that historically there are four types of warfare: melee, mass, 
maneuver, and swarming.  See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.  Swarming & the Future of Conflict.  
(Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, 2000), 7-9. 
54 Ibid., vii. 
55 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.  Swarming & the Future of Conflict.  (Santa Monica, CA:  
RAND, 2000), 45-74. 
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Arquilla and Ronfeldt have no illusions that creating swarm forces will be easy, 
and they provide many considerations military planners must remember if doctrinal 
proponency is advanced beyond the scholarly literature.  Taking these two works as his 
departure point, Sean Edwards returns with a more in-depth examination of swarming in 
his doctoral dissertation. 
Titled Swarming and the Future of Warfare, Sean Edwards dives deeper into 
swarming, producing a “theory that explains the phenomenology of swarming.”56  
Edwards expands his case studies from his previous work from 10 to 23 in his 
dissertation, expanding the number of variables, to provide a more in-depth 
understanding of swarming concepts and swarm tactics have been used both successfully 
and unsuccessfully.  Taking the five variables he considers most important to swarming 
success (based on his case studies), he creates a model that “predicts swarming outcomes 
based on his theory.”57 
Edwards’s theory comes down to “when the key components of swarming are 
present – simultaneity and encirclement – and the swarm possesses specific combinations 
of three enablers – elusiveness, standoff capability, superior situational awareness – then 
the swarm stands a good chance of winning.”58  Chapters 1-7 and Appendix A provide 
excellent supporting material and departure points for numerous sections of this thesis in 
defining swarming and nonlinear dispersed (NLD) forces and their tactics and doctrinal 
considerations, and what differentiates swarming from other types of warfare.59  Chapter 
8 is of special interest to this thesis, as Edwards lays the groundwork for asking how our 
forces can defend against enemy swarms and how our forces can use the swarm.60  Dr. 
Edwards generates additional ideas about how swarm forces may be employed, 
organized, trained, equipped, and logistically supported.61  Reinforcements and other 
                                                 
56 Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming and the Future of Warfare, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005), xvii. 
57 Ibid., xvii. 
58 Ibid., 131. 
59 Ibid., 1-147, and 269-280.  
60 Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming and the Future of Warfare, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005), 149-176. 
61 Ibid., 149-176. 
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considerations that a swarm force would need to be planned for are also considered.62  
With the brief survey of swarming literature complete, we will examine select historical 
works for swarm-related themes and historical documentation of the use of swarm tactics. 
2. Historical Survey  
Relying on many of the same resources as Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Edwards did in 
their works,63 this thesis will dive into a more detailed analysis of those battles with a few 
additional sources.  While literature on the Chechen War is in abundance, there is a finite 
amount of credible, scholarly literature that provides the information required to frame 
this analysis properly.  An allusion must be made to that literature that was used in the 
swarming examples discussed earlier in this chapter.  Omitting works highly referenced 
by Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Edwards in the battles they documented, a few remarks will be 
made relative to the Winter War and the Soviet-Afghan War. 
The Winter War between Finland and Russia (1939-40) is a truly unique example 
of a conventional army using what Edwards would classify as both linear and nonlinear 
dispersed forces against a superior conventional army.  Three books in particular 
provided valuable information critical to the short synopsis provided earlier, but also 
provide the most relevant scholarly literature in regard to the swarm tactics used by the 
Finns.  A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940 (Algonquin, 1991) 
by William R. Trotter, The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939-1940 
(Stackpole, 1973) by Eloise Engle & Lauri Paananen, and The White Death: The Epic of 
the Soviet-Finnish Winter War (Michigan State, 1971) provide ‘Pro-Finnish’ accounts of 
the war that Finnish use of swarm tactics.  The ‘Pro-Soviet’ text read in preparation for 
this thesis reads almost like Soviet propaganda, and discounts the tremendous valor and 
ingenuity of the Finns in developing guerrilla-like swarming tactics.  While the Finns 
ultimately lost the war against the Soviets, the two books cited above add depth to our 
literature that can be associated with swarming.  The Soviet-Afghan War surprisingly 
                                                 
62 Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming and the Future of Warfare, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005), 149-176. 
63 See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.  Swarming & the Future of Conflict.  (Santa Monica, CA:  
RAND, 2000), and Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming and the Future of Warfare, (Santa Monica: RAND, 
2005), and Swarming on the Battlefield.  Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, 2000. 
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provides additional evidence of late 20th century swarming tactics that are nearly as 
relevant as the Chechen Wars due to its similarity between our current fight in Iraq. 
While there is a plethora of books and other military and scholarly literature on 
the Soviet Afghan War, three works stand out as contributing to our body of knowledge 
on swarming.  Tactics of the Crescent Moon by H. John Poole, The Other Side of the 
Mountain by Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, and The Soviet-Afghan War: How a 
Superpower Fought and Lost: The Russian General Staff edited by Lester W. Grau and 
Michael A. Gress not only provide extremely critical reviews of the war, they highlight 
the swarm tactics and nonlinear dispersed (NLD) nature of the mujahideen.  The Other 
Side of the Mountain was actually written for the Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command, so its analysis of tactics and individual battles is insightful and relevant to any 
student of counterinsurgency.  Similarly, The Soviet-Afghan War provides extremely 
valuable information. 
Grau and Gress provide a literary masterpiece of the war.  Their documentation of 
tactics describes several of our swarming examples from other works - without Grau and 
Gress having an explicit swarming or NLD perspective.  For example, they document 
that the mujahideen “Often, they would use a phony withdrawal to draw their enemy into 
a prepared fire sack.”64  This is very similar to the Mongol mangudai.65  The last book 
that was helpful actually is a book about militant Muslims.   
Tactics of the Crescent Moon is a valuable tool that provides a broad look at 
various battles from Gallipoli to the Soviet-Afghan War.  As such, it is also valuable for 
our case study of the Chechen Wars.  But more than this, the book hopes to make the 
reader understand that fighting militant Muslims is not like fighting any conventional 
force.  Poole highlights that their tactics are unconventional and foes must be prepared to 
fight a guerrilla war.  Additionally, Poole adds to our ever-expanding examples of 
swarming by documenting that ““The Turks…[liked] ambushes and stratagems of every 
                                                 
64 Lester W. Grau & Michael A. Gress, Eds.  The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and 
Lost: The Russian General Staff, (Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas, 2002), 63. 
65 Sean J.A. Edwards, .  Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future.  (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2000), 29. 
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sort…[I]n battle they advanced not in one mass, but in small scattered bands, which 
swept along the enemy’s front and around his flanks, pouring in flights of arrows…””66  
The regret is that Poole has chosen such a broad spectrum of examples that he cannot 
dive into more details of the additional factors surrounding the success of the Muslim 
militants.  Now our sights must turn the literature specific to the Chechen Wars.  A 
general understanding of what these works contribute is better suited to our efforts here. 
When one looks at Chechnya, there is an overabundance of literature on almost 
every facet of the war there.  Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus by Carlotta Gall & 
Thomas de Waal, Anatol Lieven’s Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, Olga 
Oliker’s Russia’s Chechen War: 1994-2000, Trenin’s & Malashenko’s Russia’s Restless 
Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia and Aldis’s and McDermontt’s 
Russian Military Reform: 1992-2002 all provide depth in historical detail of the Chechen 
and Russian sides to the Chechen Wars.  Additionally, Mars Unmasked: The Changing 
Face of Urban Operations by Sean Edwards discusses how things are changing on the 
urban battlefield and is relevant to answering the research questions.  We are unable to 
gain a full appreciation for the Chechen and Russia sides pertinent to our study from each 
individual work.  But taken together, they provide a fairly complete picture.  The RAND 
studies (Oliker and Edwards) are short and to the point, providing immediate answers to 
many questions.  The other works must be used in a selective and integrated way in order 
to examine issues and answer specific questions.  For the purposes of this thesis, the 
literature focus is on those writings that analyze lessons learned on both sides, as it is 
important for us to look at the offensive and defensive side of swarming.  The fact that 
the Chechens have been oppressed by the Russians for decades, motivated fighters to a 
higher degree of resolve and created a society familiar with combat as chapter two will 
reveal.  However, the fact that the use of swarm tactics demoralized and broke the 
Russian soldiers’ will to fight in the 1994-96 war is an important focus for further 
analysis.  When the Second Chechen War began in 1999, the Russian forces returned  
 
                                                 
66 H. John Poole, Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods (Emerald Isle, NC:  
Posterity Press, 2004), 4.  He is citing Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows, (Garden City, NY:  
Doubleday & Co., 1975), 49. 
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with a vengeance and resolve not to be humiliated again.  U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 
3-06.11’s Appendix H covers lessons learned from modern urban combat, including 
Chechnya. 
In FM 3-06.11 after a very brief synopsis of the events leading to conflict and the 
aftermath of the war, general and specific lessons are covered in detail.  Like many other 
works it remains focused on bulletized lists and short narratives to name the lessons from 
Chechnya.  FM 3-06.11 and others recognize the Chechen tactics, but no time is spent 
analyzing the swarming doctrine that provided the foundation for such an overwhelming 
Chechen tactical and operational victory in Grozny in 1996.  This thesis will attempt to 
coherently and succinctly capture the organizational, command, control and 
communications (C3), doctrine and training, and logistics factors for the Chechens and 
Russian forces.  Additionally, this thesis will extract Russian counters to the swarm 
tactics that enabled Russian forces to decisively retake Grozny in the Second Chechen 
War.  It seems apparent from the literature that the combination of the swarm tactics in 
urban environments and the use of terrorism are the two main factors achieving no less 
than a Chechen victory during the First Chechen War.  The final component of the 
literature review is that of military doctrine and emerging concepts. 
3. Emerging Concepts and Issues 
Swarming concepts and tactics are not foreign to military experiments, but swarm 
tactics have not been generally embraced by the military leadership.  There has been 
some interest at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL).  However, that interest 
subsided in 1999.  While there still appears to be some interest in swarming of 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, swarming as a tactic of 
ground forces has been more or less passed by for more emerging concepts, such as 
distributed operations.  The MCWL briefly looked at swarming tactics during the Hunter 
Warrior warfighting experiment a decade ago, however, the Marine Corps’ focus has 
moved on to DO and developing Counterinsurgency (COIN) Doctrine67 with the Army.  
                                                 
67 U.S. Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency MCWP 3-33.5, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. 
Marine Corps, 2006). 
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The use of swarm tactics sparks debate among those working concepts, especially when 
posed against the latest dollar fetching concepts such as DO.   
A student of swarming concepts may be able to visualize how the DO concept 
could be applied to swarming, but MCWL staff makes it perfectly clear that swarming 
and the urban swarm techniques ended with the Project Metropolis Advanced 
Warfighting Experiment (AWE).  Regardless, it is extremely important for this thesis to 
keep ever in mind our preceding discussion of DO concept for its ability to fill doctrinal 
voids and enhance warfighting capabilities in relation to swarming concepts.  For this 
thesis, while there will be parallels to swarming and other NLD force concepts in 
guerrilla warfare, the focus remains the potential for swarming to develop into a doctrinal 
concept that fills a void from both current and that emerging doctrinal concepts like DO.  
In my review of the AWE after actions, doctrinal pubs, and concept brief, the author was 
left many questions and concerns.  Accordingly, the publications reviewed for this study 
will only take us so far, as the author has learned that DO is hindered by many of the 
same variables we will look at during our case study and final analysis of a potential 
swarming doctrine.  With the literature review complete, the next section will discuss the 
methodology for this thesis. 
H. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
1. Methodology 
The methodology to be used in this thesis is the case study method.  In using this 
method, the author will look at two battles in which one side’s forces employed 
swarming tactics.  Stepping forward from the work previous authors of swarming and 
literature on the Chechen Wars, the author intends to develop the independent variables, 
such as organization, logistics, and communications, into workable information we can 
apply through the remainder of this thesis.  By examining swarming tactics used during 
the Chechen Wars (1994-1996 & 1999-present), we can see changes that occurred among 
both forces over time in key areas such as organization, C3, doctrine and tactics, and 
logistics. 
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This analysis by case study will use the following variables throughout this text.  
The dependent variable in this case study is the outcome of battles between a swarming 
force and a more traditional adversary.  The independent variables in this study are the 
organization, C3, doctrine and training, and logistics.  Intervening variables are identified 
as terrain, and whether swarming forces are on the offensive or defensive.  By setting up 
the historical context of the use of swarming tactics, it can be applied to our current SOF 
and conventional forces in battles we are engaged in at the present.  The same 
independent variables can be applied to insurgent or guerrilla forces in an effort to better 
understand the enemy.  The variable relationship will look as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Thesis Variables 
The variables were chosen for these reasons.  In both Arquilla’s and Ronfeldt’s, 
and Edwards’s texts, they identify numerous variables in their analyses, yet they all come 
back to addressing a swarming doctrine potential in several problem areas, identified 
above as the independent variables.68  Through the independent application of the 
variables above to the previous studies and historical literature on the Chechen Wars, 
additional lessons learned should emerge that will deepen our understanding of these 
conflicts and how those variables impact the tactics of swarming relative to doctrinal 
gaps and the potential of developing swarming doctrinal concepts. 
                                                 
68 See, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.  Swarming & the Future of Conflict.  (Santa Monica, CA:  
RAND, 2000), 55-74 & Sean Edwards.  Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future.  (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 65-76. 
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2. Primary, Secondary and Other Sources 
The author utilized the following primary sources in this research, and is grateful 
for their cooperation and support:  Dr. John Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Dr. Sean Edwards of the National Ground Intelligence Center and Dr. Russell Richards, 
Manager, Office of Research and Technology Applications at U.S. Joint Forces 
Command and the staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory.  Additional primary 
source material includes exercise after action reports consolidated at the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory.  Secondary source material includes scholarly and historical 
literature, and official Marine Corps and Army publications on counterinsurgency, 
insurgency, guerrilla warfare, warfighting concepts and doctrine. 
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II. THE CHECHEN WARS & SWARMING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the First (1994-1996) and Second (1999-present) 
wars in Chechnya are arguably the most significant conflicts between a conventional 
military against a guerrilla force waging a counterinsurgency since the Vietnam War.  
There are many lessons to be drawn from the First and Second Chechen Wars.  Many of 
the lessons have been focused on more or less what the Russians did wrong and right and 
how it should apply to U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine, force organization, 
command and control, communications, training and tactics.  To date, limited analytical 
rigor has been specifically applied to lessons from this conflict to see if there is potential 
to develop swarming concepts for inclusion in U.S. military doctrine. 
Swarm tactics employed by the Chechens devastated Russian forces during the 
First and well into the Second Chechen Wars before the swarm was countered.  We are 
interested in the additional lessons from these Wars related to swarming’s effectiveness 
and ineffectiveness in the context of our independent variables.  Are the still additional 
lessons to be learned from the Chechen Wars?  Did the independent variables establish 
the conditions which led to swarm success by the Chechens?  Did the changes in the 
independent variables by the Russians in-between the wars lead to any ability to defeat or 
mitigate the Chechen swarm.  To answer these questions, this chapter includes a thorough 
analysis of the Chechen and Russian forces, but through a lens specifically focused 
toward swarming.  This chapter will examine the organizational structure, command, 
control and communications (C3), doctrine and training, and logistics of Chechen and 
Russian forces in relation to the offensive use of swarm tactics and defensive tactics to 
counter it.  Furthermore, since the Chechen Wars span a period in excess of 13 years 
(technically the Second War is still unresolved), it is important to see whether each side 
changed with the variables over time.  In order to frame the conditions favorable to 
swarming in these wars, this chapter will also identify key factors that enabled the swarm 
force success, as well as factors which led to the swarm force defeat, or at a minimum, 
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the reduction of its effectiveness on the Russians.  This chapter’s hypothesis is that there 
is much more for U.S. forces to learn from the Chechen Wars thru the above analysis 
which will expose additional lessons learned and ultimately aid in answering the question 
of whether or not swarming concepts should be added to our doctrine. 
B. CHECHEN FORCES 
This section will look at the following variables for the Chechen forces: 
organizational structure, command, control and communications (C3), doctrine and 
training, and logistics.  The intent is to see how they structured each to enable their forces 
to use swarming concepts and swarm tactics against a conventional military superpower.  
Specifically, we look at each variable in the context of both Chechen Wars which 
encompassed the three battles for Grozny.  For example, what aspects of the organization 
and C3 of the Chechen forces become key enablers that allowed them to swarm Russian 
forces in the battles for Grozny? 
The organization for this section is straightforward.  It is organized in the context 
of how each variable affected Chechen forces’ performance in battle, most notably their 
ability to swarm.  First, the chapter will look at the organization of Chechen forces.  Next, 
Chechen C3 will be examined to see if their use of C3 was a key enabler for swarming 
success, including a look at the Chechen use of technology, mainly in communications 
equipment and how it affected their ability to swarm.  This will be followed by a sub-
section on doctrine, training and logistics.  This chapter is important because we need to 
see what critical capabilities enabled swarm force’s success, not only for our own use of 
swarming as a tactic, but to counter the swarm when it is used against U.S. forces. 
1. Organization 
When Olga Oliker wrote “The enemies that U.S. forces will face in the future are 
far more likely to resemble the Chechen rebels than the Russian Army,”69 she couldn’t 
have been closer to the truth in light of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and more 
                                                 
69 Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat, (Santa Monica:  
RAND, 2001), 2. 
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specifically, Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  When the 
Russian forces (both civilian and military) entered Grozny for the first time in 1994, they 
did not face a disorganized, band of rebels.70  What the Russians encountered was a 
highly prepared and organized insurgent force capable of putting up a fight.71  One of the 
defining features of the Chechen insurgents was their ability to task organized units of 
various sizes and capabilities to fight the Russians.  Oliker cites that “Russians and 
Chechen sources agree that nonstandard squads were the basis of the rebel force.”72 
The Chechens were not just a bunch of tribal Neanderthals.  Many of the 
Chechens had prior experience in the Soviet and/or Russian military, and in fact, had 
many of the weapons systems their Russian counterparts would bring to the fight.  The 
Chechens had several types of units employed during the battles for Grozny.  Sean 
Edwards highlights one Chechen organized unit specifically tasked with swarming 
against the Russians.  The unit was composed of “Roving bands of 10-15 men [who 
could further subdivide into 3- to 4-man cells] would swarm toward the sound of Russian 
engines and volley fire RPG-7 and RPG-18 antitank missiles from upper-floor 
window.”73  Another element of the Chechen insurgency was the sniper. 
Chechen snipers were arguably the most psychologically debilitating weapon that 
the Chechens had.  Oliker writes “Chechen snipers, whether operating alone or as part of 
an ambush group, nightly terrified Russian soldiers, who dubbed them “ghosts”….They 
were no less deadly in daylight.”74  The Chechens were not simply a band of rebels 
armed with AK-47s and RPGs.  Embedding the feared Chechen sniper, or even multiple 
sniper teams within these “small roving bands”, produced a lethal swarming force that 
man for man decimated the Russian military and civilian forces.  The Chechens 
                                                 
70 Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat, (Santa Monica:  
RAND, 2001), 16. 
71 Ibid., 16. 
72 Ibid., 19. 
73 Sean J.A. Edwards, Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations, (Santa Monica:  
RAND, 2000), 29. 
74 Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat, (Santa Monica:  
RAND, 2001), 21. 
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organizational flexibility lent itself to form other units, as required, that were effective 
against the Russians.  Just prior to the Second Chechen War, Chechen leader Shamil 
Basayev divided his forces into groups during the fighting in Dagestan.75  Oliker 
describes the groups as “subdivided into “battalions” of 50-70 people, “companies” of 
15-20, and “platoons” of 5-7.”76  This is not something one would typically see in 
Western armed forces. 
There are other examples of how the Chechen task-organized units mostly built 
around the ability to ambush or swarm their Russian adversary.77  Clearly, the Chechen 
forces were nonlinear dispersed (NLD) forces, using conventional military weapons, 
often in unconventional ways which created an asymmetrical enemy that proved difficult 
for the Russian forces to defeat throughout the three battles for Grozny.  Now that we 
have an idea of the Chechen structure, just how were they commanded and controlled, 
and by what means? 
2. Command, Control, and Communications 
The Chechens used a decentralized command and control (C2) network.  While 
they did identify a leader, first under General Dudayev, then under Shamil Basayev, these 
leaders did not have the rigid centralized command and control one might expect.  Oliker 
notes that during the preparation for battle in Grozny in 1994, the Chechens “developed 
war plans, divided up zones of responsibility…and set up effective communications,”78 
yet it seems clear that the tactical fight was left to the small unit leaders operating under a 
common commander’s intent. 
                                                 
75 Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat, (Santa Monica:  
RAND, 2001), 41. 
76 Ibid., 41. 
77 In Olga Oliker’s book referenced above, she cites several more units that were task-organized for 
combat against the Russians.  See pages 16-28 in her book for more examples of how organizational 
decisions affected battlefield tactics. 
78 Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat, (Santa Monica:  
RAND, 2001), 16. 
 29
Sean Edwards notes “At the tactical level, the loose organization and command of 
most of the Chechen volunteer force had both positive and negative aspects.”79  He 
continues that “independent groups of autonomous units could operate efficiently in the 
fluid, nonlinear, urban battlefield, helping to alleviate the complex command and control 
[C2] problem.”80  Edwards reports that the negative side of this loose command and 
control network when working with a volunteer force was “a lack of discipline and 
responsibility,” or just leaving assigned posts “when they got bored.”81  A key enabler for 
the Chechen decentralized C2 structure during the Chechen Wars was their 
communications systems and use of technology. 
During the First Chechen War, Russians communicated én clair, which allowed 
the Chechens to intercept communications from the Chechen’s Russian radios.82  
Because the Chechens could speak both Chechen and Russian, it permitted them “to 
transmit disinformation over Russian radio channels to draw Russian forces into harm’s 
way.”83  It wasn’t until the Second Chechen War and prior to the third battle for Grozny 
that the Russian’s would upgrade to secure communications equipment.84  The 
Chechen’s communications managed to outpace the Russians through the first war, but 
still managed to hold their own during the second war despite Russian advances. 
The Chechens, during the First Chechen War, primarily used tactical radios and 
Motorola and Nokia handhelds.85  While some authors assert there were cellular 
networks operating in Grozny, others state that it was not possible during the first two 
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83 Ibid., 19. 
84 Anne C. Aldis & Roger N. McDermott, Eds., Russian Military Reform: 1992-2002, (Portland, OR:  
Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 213. 
85 This was a common theme among all resources cited in this chapter.  Oliker, Edwards and Aldis & 
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battles for Grozny due to the amount of infrastructure destroyed by the Russians.86  
Despite this, the handhelds were in plentiful supply and the Chechens were able to 
distribute them to very low levels, facilitating small, independent autonomous units who 
were still highly networked via secure communications by using the Chechen language, 
which few Russian troops spoke.87  This type of communications structure facilitated 
swarming by Chechen forces during the First Chechen War.  When the Russians 
improved their communications systems between the wars, so did the Chechens. 
Oliker states that “the Chechen communications infrastructure improved 
significantly over five years….The Chechens had an NMT-450 analog cellular network 
with two base stations, including one in Grozny.”88  This allowed Chechen field 
commanders “to have 20-60 ‘correspondents’ in their radio network, and 60-80 
‘correspondents’ in the reconnaissance information network of short-wave range.”89  The 
Chechens also added “Mobile INMARSAT and Iridium terminals”90 to their existing 
complement of handheld and tactical radios.  Furthermore, Oliker reports that “Leading 
(Chechen) field commanders also had television transmitters…sufficient to transmit 
within a given commanders territory.”91  This goes to show that the Chechen leaders 
worked diligently between the wars to improve communications across the board.  
Clearly, the more empowered ability to communicate allowed the Chechens to continue 
using swarming tactics despite the Russian’s increased capabilities, because 
communications assets were available to even the smallest Chechen unit. 
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3. Doctrine, Training & Logistics 
Having established already that many of the Chechens had served in the Soviet 
military and had Soviet/Russian weapons and equipment, it is logical to assume that their 
doctrine and training was a mirror image of the Russians.  This assumption would be 
wrong.  Almost every single source on lessons learned on the Chechen Wars cite the “hit 
and run” and swam tactics employed by the Chechens.  Most authors label the Chechens 
as guerrillas, but yet they never developed or adhered to classic guerrilla doctrine as 
promulgated by Mao Tse-Tung, where guerrilla operations eventually turn to force-on-
force conventional battles against state forces.92  To date, the Chechens are still using the 
same guerrilla and swarm tactics against the Russians, which mainly consist of several 
types of ambushes, mine warfare, and the swarm tactics described in the first chapter.93  
They attacked with surprise.  Later in this chapter we’ll see just how devastating these 
tactics were to the Russians.  So, with no formal doctrine, one might suppose that there 
would be no training for Chechen fighters.  This would be a wrong assumption. 
The Chechens trained everyone, and they trained to a much higher level of 
proficiency than that of their Russian adversaries.  Even from a young age, everyone, 
especially the men, was taught how to use weapons.94  Tribal and clan-based in nature, 
the Chechens would unite to fight adversaries, with the potential for a majority of the 
population to be trained in weapons employment.95  Lessons learned and successful 
tactics could quickly be spread to all the Chechen fighters.  Arquilla and Karasik write: 
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These groups “commuted” from their homes to the field of battle.  While 
home, they would share, through story-telling sessions, their latest 
experiences with other units of the taip, offering advice about how to fight 
the Russians, as well as technical tips about such matters as how to alter 
grenade launchers with saws to provide them with more velocity.96 
This, combined with the numerous fighters who were former Soviet soldiers, established 
a foundation in training.  But familiarity with weapons was only one aspect. 
The Chechens had some of the best snipers, which compared to their Russian 
counterparts, gave distinct advantages to the Chechens.  Additionally, many of the 
Chechens who were former Soviet soldiers were trained in “mountain guerrilla fighting,” 
most likely from the Soviet-Afghan War, to which most Russian units had no equal.97  
The Chechens were trained and often conducted operations at night, to which the 
Russians had no answer.  Even though the Chechens had similar night vision equipment 
to the Russians, the accounts don’t mention that night vision equipment had anything to 
do with the Chechen forces’ ability to carry out devastating night attacks.98  The 
Chechen’s mine warfare was equally menacing to the Russians. 
The Chechens used mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) extensively, 
and they became very good at mine and IED employment.  Mines and IEDs “caused 
roughly 40 percent of the casualties.”99  Col. Gen Serdstev (Commander, Russian 
Engineer Forces) stated that the intensity of mine warfare, to include use of IEDs and 
booby-trap mines, greatly escalated from the First to the Second Chechen War.100  
Furthermore, the Chechens were continually training and experimenting, exceeding the 
level of expertise on the Russian side.  Kramer noted that “Chechen bomb makers…built 
devices that incorporate military plastic explosives, with yields roughly five to ten times 
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greater than that of regular dynamite,” and that “the increasing number and sophistication 
of the explosives have often stymied Russian bomb-disposal engineers.”101  With this, it 
is clear that the Chechen forces were tactically proficient, well-trained, and more 
advanced than their Russian counterparts.  So how did the Chechen swarm units 
logistically support themselves? 
The answer is quite simple and common to most guerrilla wars or insurgencies.  
Especially during the First Chechen War, the Chechens had many old left-over 
Soviet/Russian weapons taken from the southern military district.102  These weapons 
included tanks, anti-aircraft guns, and a large supply of RPGs.103  The Chechens also 
were able to buy weapons and ammunition from underpaid and demoralized Russian 
troops.104  Since the Chechens were employing the swarm tactics in “friendly” cities and 
their own terrain, the logistics required to support the swarm was ideal.  Pitting the tribal 
“commute” together with a supportive population would mean that swarm units had no 
logistics tail hampering their freedom of movement, yet had enough supplies to fight 
effectively.  This brings us to our conclusion for the Chechen force analysis. 
4. Summary 
Given this almost one-sided support for swarm forces, are there lessons we can 
pull that will set some foundations for employing and defending against swarm tactics 
and swarming concepts?  Using the Chechen model, we can note several things required 
for effective swarm forces. 
• Decentralized command and control 
• Clearly understood commander’s intent 
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• Highly capable small unit leaders 
• Fluid organizational structure that facilitates task-organization 
• Secure communications 
• Networked forces, with communications assets pushed to the smallest unit 
levels 
• Training & proficiency in weapons & tactics 
• Fluid tactical doctrine based in swarming concepts and guerrilla warfare. 
• Small logistical footprint – live off population and only carry what you 
need. 
These requirements may not seem significant, but were essential to the Chechen 
forces success at the tactical level against Russian forces.  Even in OIF and OEF, denying 
enemy forces any of the above tenants reduces their ability to effectively employ forces 
against ours.  This shows that we can learn more from these wars than just from existing 
literature.  It is time to now transition to the analysis of the Russian forces, with a 
reciprocal analysis of the same variables. 
C. RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES 
It is well established from the literature review and the analysis of the Chechen 
forces that an abundance of scholarly and military literature has examined the First and 
Second Chechen Wars since 1994.  The preponderance of existing literature critiquing 
the Chechen Wars focused on the bad tactics and lack of training of the Russian forces 
poised against a capable and unconstrained guerrilla insurgency.  This section’s intent is 
to take those same variables analyzed during the Chechen section and apply them to the 
Russian forces, in the context of gaining additional lessons in respect to what not to do 
and what not to do when facing enemy swarm tactics.  Those variables again are the 
organization, command, control and communications (C3), doctrine and training, and 
logistics of the Russian forces. 
Since there were three battles for Grozny, it is important to see how changes to 
our variables such as organization and C3, improved or diminished the Russian forces’ 
effectiveness as the war(s) progressed.  This section will argue that we still have must to 
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learn from the Russian’s performance in the Chechen Wars, especially when focusing on 
swarming concepts and swarm tactics as used by the Chechen insurgents.  All of our 
variables seemed submerged in the abysmal performance of the Russians during the First 
Chechen War.  For instance, C3 and organizational factors were significant problems, if 
not the defining problems of the Chechen Wars.  However, upon review of existing 
research, we’ll see that Russian doctrine, training and logistics were also severely 
deficient in preparing the forces and executing a counterinsurgency campaign.  
Furthermore, this section will offer additional lessons learned specific to all the variables 
that may have been missed by previous authors on the subject.  Armed with this 
knowledge, we’ll be one step closer to answering questions related to our ability to 
introduce swarming concepts and swarm tactics into U.S. military doctrine. 
1. What We Know – Setting the Stage 
The Russian forces at this time in history were still in many ways the same old 
Soviet military, except less well-trained, worse equipped, and still underpaid, sometimes 
not paid at all.  When diplomacy failed to resolve the problem in Chechnya, the Kremlin 
did what Russian leaders have done for centuries against internal opposition; they called 
in the military or security forces to put down the opposition.105  President Yeltsin ordered 
the Ministry of Defense as well as other Russian security forces to put down the 
insurgency and restore order to Chechnya.106  Most of the Chechen insurgent forces were 
centered on the town of Grozny, which was of vital economic importance to Russia.  
Grozny was a major thoroughfare for petroleum products for Russia, and the Kremlin 
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could not afford to have this strategic area go independent.107  The first battle for Grozny 
(1994-95) was an eventual Russian win.  The second battle for Grozny (1996) was a 
Chechen victory which left peace in Chechnya for three years.  The third battle for 
Grozny (1999) during the Second Chechen War was a clear Russian victory, but the war 
in Chechnya is still far from over. 
Whereas the Chechen force analysis took each variable in a separate analysis, this 
section groups the variables in the context of the First and Second Chechen Wars.  As 
previously mentioned, it is important to gain the perspective of what changes occurred 
between the wars which ultimately resulted in a Russian victory and gave them a firm 
hold on the capital of Grozny.  The Chechen’s improvements between the two wars were 
not as substantial as the Russians, so we gain more information from treating the 
insurgent and the counterinsurgent differently.  To start this first subsection, we will 
identify the significant lessons documented from the First Chechen War, which 
encompass the first two battles for Grozny.  This will be followed by the Second Chechen 
War and a brief conclusion.   
2. The First Chechen War 1994-1996 
Sean Edwards, General Anatoly Sergeevich Kulikov, Olga Oliker and many 
others have compiled well-thought lists of observations, lessons and reflections on the 
Russian forces’ organizational constructs and C3 in the battles for Grozny and the greater 
Chechen Wars as a whole.  Oliker finds the following lessons from the first two battles 
for Grozny: 
• “The wide range of ministries and organizations with troops deployed to 
Chechnya each had its own competing command structures.”108 
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• “Coordination between Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD) units, between ground and air forces, and among 
troops on the ground was abysmal.”109 
• “They (the forces) had incompatible communications equipment and 
protocols.”110 
When the Chechens attacked Russian forces garrisoned in Grozny for the second battle, 
the Russians had incorporated some lessons from the first battle, but sufficient problems 
remained that allowed the numerically superior Russian force to be picked apart by the 
Chechens.  Sean Edwards highlights C2 and organizational issues continued to haunt 
Russian forces throughout the entire First Chechen War, to include problems 
coordinating actions “between air and ground forces.”111 
Edwards also identifies the fact that Russia has never had a professional Non-
Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps.112  With Russian forces having to break down into 
platoons and squads, the leadership deficit impacted nearly every unit that engaged in 
combat operations in Grozny.  Edwards notes, “Raymond Finch argues that poor 
leadership was the main reason why the Russians failed.  The issue of absurd orders, the 
casual disregard for the fate of soldiers, the abysmal conditions of the common soldier, 
and general corruption were the main leadership failures.”113  Anne Aldis and Roger 
McDermott highlighted several issues relevant to this discussion, reinforcing the 
importance of C2 and organizational factors. 
Aldis and McDermott found that C2 at the most senior levels resulted in “the 
division of responsibility remained haphazard, while various units were controlled and 
                                                 
109 Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat, (Santa Monica, 
CA:  RAND, 2001), xi. 
110 Ibid., xi. 
111 Sean Edwards, Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations, (Santa Monica, CA:  
RAND, 2000), xvii. 
112 Sean Edwards, Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations, (Santa Monica, CA:  
RAND, 2000), 33.  Also, Prof. John Arquilla (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA) notes that prior 
to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukrainians made up most of the NCO Corps.  William Odom in his 
book, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1998), 43-47 notes that 
the conscription changes made in 1967, thus reducing terms of service, also had noticeable effects on 
enlisted soldiers and the inability to keep soldiers in long enough to make them professionally trained 
NCOs. 
113 Sean Edwards, Swarming and the Future of War, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005) 274. 
 38
supplied by their respective bureaucracies.”114  Organization for battle was a tremendous 
problem for Russian forces.  “An army with over 70 divisions in its notional order of 
battle struggled to raise a handful of deployable units,” resulting in “Officers and men 
who had never served together before were sent into battle in ‘composite regiments’.”115  
But who better to comment on Russian C2 and organizational problems than the man sent 
in to rescue the First Chechen War? 
General Kulikov notes that Moscow had never tried to put all the agencies and 
MoD separate service units under a “single joint command.”116  Kulikov states that the 
appointed joint commander was to “have full command and decision 
authority…including those of non-MoD ministries involved in the operation.”117  The 
most compelling of Kulikov’s comments comes in his conclusion, when he states “the 
need for a joint command, unity of command for all forces…particularly the need to form 
and deploy forces” was the first and one of his “key” lessons for how the Russians had 
misjudged the impacts to force operations in Chechnya.118  He continues with “One of 
our most significant problems turned out to be the organization of a single unified 
command for the forces.”119  The C3 and organizational problems were complicated by 
doctrine, training and logistics deficiencies. 
Standing from the sidelines and watching the Russians enter Grozny in December 
1994; one might ask if there was the existence of a military doctrine for fighting in urban 
terrain or against insurgencies and guerrilla forces.  In all three, the answer is yes.  
However, even with the fresh lessons from Afghanistan, the Russians enter Grozny ready 
to give battle to a conventional enemy.  Michael Orr writes “The Soviet ground forces 
therefore were designed to wage a high-intensity, high-technology war…The experience 
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of the Afghan War (1979-89) did not alter the Soviet ground forces’ preoccupation with 
large-scale conventional or tactical nuclear warfare.”120  And one cannot turn to current 
and previous versions of the Russian military doctrine for guidance in operational or 
tactical employment of forces.  The Russian military doctrine is more equivalent to the 
U.S.’s National Military Strategy than a doctrinal publication such as Marine Corps 
Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0 Operations.121  This ambivalence to unconventional 
warfare on the part of the larger Russian Army was not without criticism.  Officers did 
advocate modifying doctrine and tactics to fight other non-conventional wars, but this fell 
on deaf ears.122  So, one has to ask how the Russian tactics fared against the swarm 
tactics? 
During the First Chechen War, despite whatever doctrine or tactics the Russian 
forces used; doctrinal publications, formal schools and training ranges are irrelevant if 
your soldiers are not prepared for combat.  Sean Edwards notes that “The problem was 
that urban operations skills were a lost art among most active duty soldiers because 
military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) training was almost nonexistent.  In 
Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, Gall and de Waal show a weak, scared and broken 
Russian combined force that was completely ineffective against the Chechen fighters 
during the second battle for Grozny.123  A stark reality emerges that the only units that 
had training in urban operations were the Russian naval infantry and Spetnaz (Special 
Forces).124   
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Teaming the Special Forces units with the conventional units did prove effective.  
Eventually they did manage to relearn the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) 
involved in isolating a city…”125  Against the swarm, their tactics were still mostly 
ineffective unless they could pin down or isolate the swarm units.  Once pinned down, 
the Russians would hammer the Chechens with fires or assault forces.126  The Russians 
“began establishing ambushes on approach routes into selected areas, and then running 
vehicles in these areas as bait to lure Chechen hunter-killer teams to their destruction.”127  
Additionally, the Russians did manage to learn how to use anti-aircraft artillery and the 
RPO-A Shmel flamethrowers to great effect in Grozny, especially against snipers.128   
Thus, these examples did show that the Russian’s got better at fighting the Chechen 
swarm as the war continued, but it was tossed aside with a Russian withdraw from 
Grozny at the end of the second battle for Grozny.  Logistical support for Russian forces 
started out bad, and just seemed to get worse as the war continued. 
The logistics units of Russian forces were even more vulnerable to Chechen 
swarm tactics.  Russian logistics was already fragile before the war, and was quickly 
overwhelmed by the war in Chechnya.129  The Army Field Manual (FM) for Combined 
Arms Operations in Urban Terrain dedicates an entire appendix to the lessons from the 
First Chechen War.130  Almost a dozen lessons alone are logistically oriented.  As 
abysmal as the infantry did at first against the Chechen swarm, one can only imagine how 
bad it was for the logistics troops.  Indeed, the FM documents “The logistical unit 
soldiers were hopelessly inept at basic military skills, such as perimeter defense, 
establishing security overwatch, and so forth, and thereby fell easy prey to the 
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Chechens.”131  As a result, the Russians had to pull infantryman back to aid logistics 
operations.132  At the conclusion of the First Chechen War, two battles for Grozny had 
been waged, with each side claiming one victory, but leaving the Chechen’s in charge 
and the Russians pulling out.  Three years would pass before Russian troops would be 
reintroduced into Chechnya, hoping to not repeat their previous mistakes. 
3. The Second Chechen War 1999 – Present 
After three years, one might not expect similar mistakes to be made, but yet some 
did remain.  For the Russians, they consider the Second Chechen War a success.  
Compared to their performance during the First Chechen War, it was.  The Russians were 
able to retake Grozny and still hold the city to this day.  Two factors weigh significantly 
more than others.  First, the Russians encircled the city and almost leveled it with air, 
artillery and missiles before entering.133  Second, the Russians brought overwhelming 
force and have since maintained a large occupation force in Grozny.  Whereas they 
Russians brought 25,000 troops to the first battle for Grozny, the Russians had over 
95,000 when they returned for a third time in the Second Chechen War.134 Despite this 
‘victory’, the Russian performance still left much to be desired.  While it may have 
appeared that they blanketed the city with troops, the Chechen fighters were still able to 
enter and leave the city almost at will.135  Oliker notes the following successes and 
failures of organization and C3 when the Russians came back for the third battle for 
Grozny: 
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• “A single hierarchy under MoD command simplified and improved 
command and control.”136 
• “Force coordination and synchronization of air and land operations 
improved vastly.”137 
• “The improved force coordination often broke down, leading to problems 
and recriminations particularly among MoD forces, MVD forces, and 
Chechen loyalists’ forces.”138 
So Oliker identifies that the Russians did try and fix mistakes of the First Chechen 
War, but it appears that C3 problems still plagued commanders at all levels once operations 
commenced.  Aldis and McDermott support Oliker’s observations, and add that 
communications technologies acquired in the interwar period (1996-1999) did improve the 
Russian forces capability to command and control.139  Specifically, they state that while 
Putin’s leadership guidance in the Second Chechen War was aimed at unifying the C2 under 
a single commander, other ministries still would not play nice and continued to exacerbate 
the C2 problems that had existed during the First Chechen War.140  Aldis and McDermott 
did find that improvements were made to spread combat experience around and not create ad-
hoc units just prior to combat operations.141  So the Russians were left with improved 
tactical-level organizational practices, but were still plagued by C2 problems from the tactical 
to the strategic levels, to include interagency organizational difficulties.  Of special note are 
the changes in how Russia handled information operations in the second war. 
During the First Chechen War, the press was allowed to go anywhere they wanted 
and allowed to speak to anyone.  The Chechen’s capitalized on the press and made the war 
extremely unpopular in Russia and elsewhere.  In this second campaign, Russian leaders 
were determined that that a proper “spin” would be applied to what the media portrayed.  
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Branching off how the U.S. and NATO handled the press during the war in Kosovo, the 
Russian put “tight control” over all media during the Second Chechen War.142  Oliker notes 
that “At times there was a complete ban on reporters in Grozny or anywhere near Russian 
military forces.”143  By tightly controlling the press, “Russian commanders and soldiers told 
what was a largely a positive story of their success against a “terrorist” enemy.”144  Despite 
the positive spin, most Russian’s support for the war waned over time and public opinion of 
Russia’s “success” has declined.145  In doctrine, tactics and logistics, one would hope 
improvements would be made over the three year reprieve from combat. 
Olga Oliker states that while the Russians spent considerable resources to identify 
the lessons learned from the first war in Chechnya, little of that translated into 
improvements in urban combat.146  While there were some marginal improvements in 
logistics, equipment still antiquated and broke down frequently, leaving the Russians 
vulnerable to Chechen ambushes and swarms.147  Kramer notes that logistics units were 
habitually ambushed which left troops inadequately supported to “counter the insurgents” 
and “Without adequate supplies of basic equipment, Russian soldiers inevitably are more 
vulnerable when confronted by surprise attacks.”148  While there were improvements in 
many areas, the Russians were once again deployed their basic infantrymen with 
inadequate training in urban warfare tactics.149  As late as 2005, Russian officers were 
still trying to formalize counter-ambush tactics in order to turn the tide of the Chechen 
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swarm, but even these techniques produced mixed results.150  So, even though the 
Russian victory in Grozny was praised as a success, seven years later they are still no 
closer to achieving complete victory against the Chechens.   
4. Summary 
Even though the Second Chechen War led to an apparent Russian victory (that 
resembles more of an occupation than a clear win over the enemy) in the city of Grozny, 
a final peace has never been achieved, nor have many of the problems that lingered over 
the course of seven years been solved.  While it appears that the Russian forces did a 
much better job at organizational issues at the onset of the Second Chechen War and the 
third battle for Grozny, fixes for C2 that looked promising did not survive contact with 
the enemy.  While sources point to increased efforts to improve training and logistics, 
these improvements still left the Russians vulnerable to the swarm.  Nonetheless, the 
following lessons from the two wars in Chechnya serve to highlight several lessons 
which surprisingly have not been brought to the surface in existing literature. 
• Joint or Unified Commanders must have the authority not only to 
command and control assigned forces, but have the necessary authority 
and access to enforce compliance from agency and ministry officials who 
attempt to subvert the commanders’ legitimate command authority. 
• If operations are to be conducted that include forces from external 
agencies, then those external force agencies or ministries must be included 
in work-ups, exercises and training evolutions on a regular basis.  Training 
forces jointly before operations can allow local commanders to work 
together even if higher echelon officials are in disagreement with one 
another. 
• It is imperative that command and control relationships be solidified prior 
to commencement of operations through meetings and agreements at the 
highest levels.  If agency ministers/chiefs can agree beforehand on 
relationships and type of command authority (administrative, tactical, 
combatant), C2 debacles such as the Chechen Wars can be worked out 
well in advance. 
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• If the enemy is using tactics and concepts that decimate your forces, you 
must dedicate time and resources to train and equip your forces to counter 
those tactics or the enemy will continue to use them with great 
effectiveness. 
• The swarm can be defeated, but learning how takes lives.  There is no 
textbook answer, as each adversary may employ swarm tactics and 
swarming concepts differently.  The Russians were eventually able to 
develop tactics that could defeat swarm units.  The most effective tactics 
were denying key terrain and the employment of Special Forces with 
conventional units. 
• Your logistics system and combat service support troops must be able to 
provide efficient and effective support.  That means that those soldiers 
must learn infantry tactics, weapons systems, and how to fight and defend 
themselves. 
Leadership of armed forces and other agencies/ministries which normally deploy 
in support of military operations should take note of the above lessons, which would help 
alleviate the problems that Russians have yet to demonstrate they have learned.  These 
lessons are also relevant for any military force engaged in fighting non-conventional 
wars. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has conducted an analysis of both the Russian and Chechen forces 
over the course of the two Chechen Wars.  Since peace eludes this conflict, there are still 
more lessons to be learned.  This analysis reviewed both Russian and Chechen variables 
of organization, C3, doctrine, training and logistics with a focus on the use of swarming 
concepts and swarm tactics and additional lessons which could be learned from the 
Russian faults.  The result of this analysis is some valuable lessons learned which have 
not been documented before in any literature that this author reviewed.  First, by looking 
at the Chechens, we can now apply those principles and enablers to swarming concepts 
and see if they can be applied to our combat forces for use offensively.  Second, with 
those same principles and enablers, we should seek to deny or marginalize the ability of 
our adversaries to use those methods.  Third, by looking at the Russian mistakes, it 
provides tremendous insight of what not to do in conducting counterinsurgency 
operations.  Fourth, though subtle in it appearance, one cannot dismiss the force ratio 
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effects on the battle outcomes.  The Russians always had the larger force, but only in the 
first and third battles for Grozny was it significant enough to remove the Chechen 
insurgents from the city.  Finally, it shows us principles and lessons learned in which we 
can evaluate our existing military doctrine to see if swarming concepts and swarm tactics 
expose gaps in our own doctrine and warfighting concepts. 
Taking the lessons of the Chechen Wars prepares us to examine U.S. warfighting 
doctrine.  Putting a finger on Russian doctrine is difficult, and finding anything on written 
Chechen doctrine is even more elusive.  But through each side’s actions, we begin to 
formulate a picture of what doctrinal principles and concepts must be included in order 
for us to analyze it for gaps in relation to swarm tactics.  It is this very next chapter where 
we will do these things. 
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III. CURRENT DOCTRINE AND EMERGING CONCEPTS 
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in  
the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt 
themselves after the changes occur.  —  Giulio Douhet151 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter analyzing swarming in the Chechen Wars, we were able to 
gain a foundation of additional lessons learned from the Russian forces and what 
principles and enablers allowed the Chechens to employ swarm tactics.  Taking our new 
knowledge, and combining it with the existing body of lessons learned from the Chechen 
Wars, we now have a starting point to review our own doctrine with respect to swarming 
concepts and swarm tactics.  In exploring whether or not there is potential to develop 
doctrinal swarming concepts and their residual swarm tactics, this doctrinal review is the 
next logical step.  
So what is doctrine, why is it important, and why must it be framed in the context 
of our research questions?  Barry Posen defines military doctrine as a part of overall 
military strategy, telling “What means shall be employed? and How shall they be 
employed?”152  Posen writes “Military doctrine includes the preferred mode of a group of 
services, a single service, or a subservice for fighting wars.”153  He states that doctrine is 
important for two reasons. 
First, the doctrines held by the states within a system affect the quality of 
international political life.  By their offensive, defensive, or deterrent 
character, doctrines affect the probability and intensity of arms races and 
of wars.  Second, by both the political and military appropriateness of the 
means employed, a military doctrine affects the security of the state that 
holds it.  A military doctrine may harm the security interests of the state if 
it is not integrated with the political objectives of the state’s grand 
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strategy…A military doctrine may also harm the security interests of the 
state if it fails to respond to changes in political circumstances, adversary 
capabilities, or available military technology – if it is insufficiently 
innovative for the competitive and dynamic environment of international 
politics.  If war comes, such a doctrine may lead to defeat.154 
It is from doctrine that we formulate operational plans, develop training programs 
and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).  In fact, one could say that doctrine drives 
almost everything we do.  The Joint Staff writes: 
Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the 
employment of forces…It incorporates time-tested principles for 
successful military action as well as contemporary lessons which together 
guide aggressive exploitation of US advantages against adversary 
vulnerabilities.155 
Doctrine’s ultimate goal is to enable us to train and employ forces that will be successful 
in combat or other missions assigned to the armed forces.  The Joint Staff even relates 
new concepts and doctrine to military transformation. 
The Joint Staff writes, “Transformation efforts put a premium on exploring and 
“validating” concepts through joint experimentation and assessment.  Validated, value 
added concepts can impact favorably on doctrine, training, and education.”156  Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5120.02 provides a base for the 
relationship between doctrine and concepts.  The instruction describes the relationship as 
“a close and complementary relationship…In general terms, a concept contains a notion 
or statement that expresses how something might be done.”157  If concepts are found to 
improve the effectiveness of our armed forces, they can be developed into doctrine which  
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is authoritative in nature.  So, this is why this type of approach to swarming concepts is 
important.  If there is a gap because of swarming, then it must be asked whether or not it 
presents problems that need to be addressed. 
For hundreds of years, various military, insurgent, and guerrilla forces have used 
swarming tactics with both success and failure against their adversaries.  On the 
battlefield, our Marines and soldiers are producing significant kill ratios and achieving 
tactical victories, but doctrinal tactics are still grounded in conventional warfare when we 
have the resources (manpower, technologies) to exploit swarming concepts.  Some may 
say that conventional forces are ill-prepared to fight irregular warfare, especially using 
tactics such as the swarm.  We lack a doctrinal based defense against the swarm when it 
is used against us, nor do we have any formal school that teaches swarming tactics to our 
infantry, yet there is evidence of our conventional forces using swarming tactics and 
defending against (or repelling) the swarm.158 
In the next section, we will evaluate our existing military doctrine for gaps 
identified by swarming concepts.  This doctrinal review will focus on several areas of 
interest to swarming.  In reviewing our doctrinal publications and the after action reports 
from select warfighting experiments, the following questions are asked: 
• Does the doctrine/experiment discuss the use of swarm or “swarm-like” 
tactics? 
• Does the doctrine/experiment discuss defensive measures that might prove 
effective against swarm tactics? 
• Can some aspects of existing offensive or defensive doctrine or TTPs be 
applied or related to swarm tactics? 
• Does the doctrine/experiment recognize nonlinear operations, the non-
contiguous battlespace and dispersed operations? 
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What is hypothesized is that some doctrinal publications are oblivious to swarm 
tactics, while some doctrine does recognize either the environment conducive to 
swarming or key tactical enablers to the use of swarm tactics. 
B. CURRENT DOCTRINE 
The primary way a Marine leader becomes an able tactician is through 
training and education, both of which are firmly rooted in doctrine.  
Doctrine establishes the philosophy and practical framework for how we 
fight.159                -MCDP 1-3: Tactics 
Remembering that swarming is “the systematic pulsing of force and/or fire by 
dispersed, internetted units, so as to strike the adversary from all directions 
simultaneously,”160 we must look for gaps in both offensive and defensive doctrine, for 
both conventional and unconventional operations.  To accomplish this review, this thesis 
will look at the following published Marine Corps doctrinal publications: 
• Doctrinal Capstone Publications 
• Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0 Marine Corps 
Operations 
• MCDP 1-3 Tactics 
• MCDP 6 Command and Control 
• Doctrinal Warfighting/Reference Publications 
• Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-11.2 Marine 
Rifle Squad 
• MCWP 3-35.3 Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) 
• FM 90-8/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-33A 
Counterguerrilla Operations 
• Fleet Marine Field Manual (FMFM) 6-4 Marine Rifle Company 
We’ll begin with what the author found as positive elements of current doctrine. 
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1. Marine Corps Operations MCDP 1  
While MCDP 1’s focus is on conventional operations, as it applies to the Marine 
Corps as a whole, there are several items mentioned in this capstone publication that are 
of interest.  The publication does not outright mention swarm tactics, yet it does 
recognize that Marine forces may be encircled by enemy forces which put Marine forces 
in a dire situation, similar to what forces may be exposed to if swarmed by the enemy.161  
The Marine Corps has adopted the Single Battle concept, but doesn’t restrict this concept 
to linear operations in the contiguous battlespace.162  Indeed, in MCDP 1, the Marine 
Corps recognizes nonlinear in addition to linear operations, such as depicted in Figure 2.  
In Figure 2, the “single” battlefield is shown first in the traditional linear operation, where 
there is a distinct deep, close and rear battle areas.   
 
Figure 2.   U.S. Marine Corps Single Battle Concept.  Source:  MCDP 1, 6-21. 
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Additionally, Figure 2 shows how complex the “single” battle can be in nonlinear 
operations in a non-contiguous battlespace.  In nonlinear operations, the deep, close and 
rear battle areas are dispersed across the battlespace, requiring a revision of our doctrine, 
tactics and how we address the warfighting functions of fires, command and control, 
intelligence, logistics, maneuver and force protection.  This is an important tenant to 
swarming concepts, as nonlinear operations in the non-contiguous battlespace are where 
swarm tactics thrive.163  Furthermore, the Marine Corps sees that the non-contiguous 
battlespace and nonlinear operations are what the Corps must prepare for in the future.   
MCDP 1-0 authors write “A more likely situation is one where the MAGTF 
conducts nonlinear operations within a non-contiguous battlespace and within an 
operational framework with non-contiguous deep, close, and rear areas.”164  Indeed, most 
conflicts since the end of World War II have been irregular wars vice conventional state-
to-state wars.165  This keeps the door open for a future inclusion of swarming concepts 
and doctrinal TTPs, but the fact that swarming concepts or “swarm-like” tactics are not 
specifically mentioned leads one to see a doctrinal gap in this capstone publication.  The 
use of swarm tactics by Marine forces and a more pronounced preparation to defend 
against and repel the swarm is a clear doctrinal void.  Next, MCDP 1-3 Tactics is 
examined to see if any of the tenants of MCDP 1-0 passes down, or if additional doctrinal 
voids appear. 
2. Tactics MCDP 1-3  
Focusing down at the tactical level of war, nonlinear operations and the non-
contiguous battlespace are not resident in MCDP 1-3.  Several sections within this 
publication do present ‘enablers’ for nonlinear operation and more importantly, 
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swarming.  Specifically, the sections on “Surprise,” “Trapping the Enemy”, “Ambush 
Mentality,” and “Asymmetry” are important elements to swarm tactics.166  The important 
take away from this publication is the fact that the Corps does recognize some critical 
enablers to swarming in its existing doctrine and TTPs.  MCDP 1-3 does not specifically 
describe swarm tactics for offensive operations nor go into any detail on defending or 
repelling enemy swarm tactics.  These first two publications are broad enough that 
swarming concepts could be developed and incorporated.  Since the absence of swarming 
concepts creates this doctrinal void, then it should be addressed.  Another critical factor 
in the success of the swarm is the type of command and control.  Thus, it is appropriate 
for this analysis to see if Marine Corps command and control doctrine could be 
accommodating to swarming concepts. 
3. Command and Control MCDP 6  
MCDP 6 states that “No single activity in war is more important than command 
and control.”167  With that in mind, it is imperative that the theory, tenets, and principles 
of MCDP 6 support nonlinear dispersed operations occurring in non-contiguous 
battlefields.  The Corps’ capstone publication on command and control does set 
conditions that are conducive to swarming concepts.  Specifically, MCDP 6 advocates 
mission type command and control and mission orders.168  Mission type command and 
control sets the correct venue for swarming concepts and swarm tactics by: 
• Using technology to your advantage, but not becoming so reliant on it that 
you are unable to execute the mission should your technology fail.169 
• Recognizing that command is the exercise of authority and see control as a 
feedback loop between the commander and his subordinates in a fluid, 
ever-changing environment; not as something where the commander 
controls every action in a rigid system.170 
                                                 
166 U.S. Marine Corps, Tactics, MCDP 1-3, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 30 
July 1997), 47-56. 
167 U.S. Marine Corps, Command and Control, MCDP 6, (Washington, DC:  Headquarters, U.S. 
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168 Ibid., 79. 
169 Ibid., 59. 
170 Ibid., 46-7. 
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• Trusting and fostering low-level initiative in subordinates, by giving 
mission orders which give the subordinate the task to be accomplished and 
the commander’s intent (purpose of the operation, method of 
accomplishing the mission and the desired end state).171 
By promulgating a command and control philosophy and doctrine in this fashion, 
the Marine Corps has established a foundation for which swarming concepts and swarm 
tactics can be used successfully. 
4. Marine Rifle Company FMFM 6-4 and Marine Rifle Squad MCWP 3-
11.2  
In these two tactical level warfighting publications, patrolling seems to be the 
most common operation that one could build upon to use swarm tactics.  172  In their 
descriptions of different patrol types and patrolling TTPs, swarming concept enablers 
such as terrain, surprise, ambush mentality, and entrapment are given as points to 
consider when planning and executing patrols in both offense and defensive operations.  
Additionally, both publications do recognize the asymmetrical threat that guerrillas 
present over that of conventional military forces.  So, while not explicitly linking the 
guerrilla to nonlinear operations in a non-contiguous battlespace, it is implied.  This 
implication is critical for establishing the mentality to conduct nonlinear dispersed 
operations that are essential for swarm tactics.  Still, the only tangible link to swarm 
tactics in either publication is the perimeter defense mentioned in FMFM 6-4, as depicted 
in Figure 3.  Figure 3 shows a notional diagram of a company level perimeter defense, 
offering all around protection, interlocking fields of fire, and the unit reserve which can 
be employed at any point of the defense or be used to exploit opportunities.  Each of the 
formations represents a platoon, with the headquarters and reserve platoon in the center.  
If the enemy swarms this company, they are well prepared to defend against and repulse 
the attack. 
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Figure 3.   Company Perimeter Defense.  Source FMFM 6-4, 234. 
The perimeter defense offers the defender adequate protection against the swarm 
from 360 degrees.  Unlike more linear defenses, the perimeter defense’s reserve force can 
counterattack or reinforce as the situation unfolds.  By taking the company perimeter 
defense and associating it with swarming concepts and TTPs does help address a small 
part of our doctrinal gap.  Significant modifications and work on the patrolling TTPs in 
these publications can also add to our ability to exploit swarming concepts during 
offensive and defensive patrolling.  How patrols move from dispersed positions to come 
together for a convergent attack from multiple axes will be discussed in the next chapter.  
The next publication that will be discussed is warfighting doctrine for fighting in the 
urban terrain. 
5. Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) MCWP 3-35.3  
Published in 1998, the Marine Corps publication for MOUT is one of the more 
critical publications that must be scrutinized for its relevancy in our current wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, as well as against swarming concepts and swarm tactics.  There are 
several sections of this publication that are relevant to swarming, but the majority of this 
 56
doctrinal publication is void of swarm tactics or other TTPs that either aid in swarming or 
help defend against its use.  As in other Marine Corps doctrinal publications, patrolling 
begins to emerge as a common foundation upon which to build swarming concepts. 
In the chapter on patrolling, there are a few techniques which can be applied 
defensively against the swarm.  The first technique is the ‘double column’ in platoon and 
squad operations.173  The double column provides near 360 degree protection in its 
doctrinal context, as shown in Figure 4.  In Figure 4, the mutual support afforded by the 
deployment of the formation (foot mobile) and its front and rear security elements, allows 
the platoon or squad to engage the enemy swarm with effective fire by a number of 
Marines.174  Taking this tactic and adapting it with swarming concepts might yield the 
potential for small swarm teams to take an offensive while the larger force is defensively 
postured in the city.  These swarm teams (such as the fire team) deploy from firm bases 
into ambush positions.  After the initial ambush, they would take cover, disengage from 
contact (disperse) and eliminate the enemy by seeking their positions (re-attack) or 
intercepting the enemy during dispersal and before reengagement.  This is not too 
different from what Chechen hunter-killer teams did during the Chechen Wars. 
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Figure 4.   Platoon Double Column.  Source:  MCWP 3.35.3, A-58 
The TTPs described in the publication for crossing intersections also incorporates 
360 degree security, but the squad’s limited size leaves it vulnerable to the swarm.175  
Most other techniques presented in this publication leave the platoon or squad exposed to 
a decisive kill by an experienced enemy swarm force in an urban area.176  In keeping 
with the Corps’ mantra that the defense is a mere pause in our ability to conduct the 
offensive, defense of an urban area is out of character for Marine Corps doctrine.  The 
                                                 
175 U.S. Marine Corps, Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT), MCWP 3-35.3, (Washington, 
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discussion about defense of a city is disturbing in its lack of detail and creative thought in 
taking the fight to the enemy.  The next two paragraphs typify why this is “disturbing.” 
The only close mention of any TTP or doctrinal consideration that is offensive in 
nature is found in the very brief section on ambushes and entrapment.  It states “Ambush 
planning in an urban environment does not differ significantly from planning in other 
environments,”177 which is not entirely true.  Fighting in urban terrain is much more 
difficult than jungle or deserts, and usually introduces non-combatants to the tactical 
scenario.  Additionally, when you are fighting in the city, you exercise a higher level of 
scrutiny for what explosive collateral effects will be.  If defending an urban area, using 
swarm tactics against the attacking forces may give our forces an asymmetrical 
advantage, similar to what the Chechens achieved during the first battle of Grozny during 
the First Chechen War (1994-1995).  The next area of this doctrinal publication 
incompatible with swarming concepts is on command and control. 
In the section that covers the warfighting functions in urban combat, it advocates 
centralized command and control, not the centralized command and decentralized control 
that is required for effective maneuver warfare and swarm tactics.  Under “Command and 
Control in the Urban Terrain,” the publication states “The commander positions himself 
so that he can control the action.”178  The publication states that this can be difficult 
because of the nature of the urban terrain and the effects it has on visibility and 
communications.  To complicate command and control further, the writers even suggest 
that the commander could position himself underground.    
MCWP 3-35.3 MOUT’s doctrinal void actually goes beyond the omission of 
swarming concepts (with exceptions noted above).  It does not advocate the use of any 
tactics related to swarming concepts in the offense.  Aside from a brief appendix of the 
warfighting functions applied to lessons from the First Chechen War, those lessons never 
transfer to any new TTPs for Marine forces to use.179  Furthermore, they only mention a 
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few of the Chechen TTPs, failing to recognize the swarm tactics that devastated the 
Russian forces during the battles for Grozny.  After MOUT, the next publication to 
examine is Counterguerrilla Operations. 
6. Counterguerrilla Operations MCRP 3-33A  
First published in 1986, MCRP 3-33A is in dire need of an update.  It does not 
mention many of the lessons and principles of counterinsurgency that we have had to 
relearn in our current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  MCRP 3-33A does not provide 
insight into enemy tactics, such as swarming.  It does not advocate taking asymmetrical 
warfare approaches to fight the guerrillas nor does it recognize the nonlinear operations 
that will occur in the non-contiguous battlespace that counterguerrilla operations take 
place.  Like other doctrinal publications in offensive and defensive warfare, patrolling 
and raids appear to be the mainstay of tactical operations against the guerrilla forces.  The 
only defensive tactics that provide some protection against enemy swarm tactics seem to 
be identical to the perimeter defense described in FMFM 6-4, briefly mentioned during 
the section on ambushes.  Its sole focus on killing the guerrilla could be its greatest 
shortfall, as most now accept the notion that the population is the center of gravity in any 
insurgency or violent revolution that involves guerrilla opposition forces. 
In MCRP 3-33A’s appendix on ambushes, one does manage to find doctrine 
somewhat compatible with swarming concepts.  The writers focused on the triangle and 
box platoon formations, for ambushes against the guerrilla forces.  While the closed 
triangle defense offers 360 degree protection and interlocking fields of fire, it possesses 
no ability to exploit any success against the guerrilla force upon contact.  It is more akin 
to a situation where you hope that he is sufficiently weaker in force and fires, that you kill 
all the enemy force in the initial ambush, and that you do not need to pursue him.180  In 
Figure 4, we find a company level ambush.  Each unit is representative of a platoon.  This 
particular ambush relies on stealth, surprise, and a high level of coordination from each 
element in order to catch the enemy in the box and reduce the chance of fratricide 
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between friendly units.  The problems with ambushes such as depicted in Figures 4 are 
numerous.  The guerrilla force enters a kill zone between the unit positions, but the lack 
of simultaneity between units is a large tactical error which allows the guerilla time and 
space to escape. 
 
Figure 5.   Box Formation Destruction Ambush.  Source:  MCRP 3-33A, C-18. 
Given that this doctrinal publication is over twenty years old, it is not surprising 
that there is difficulty piecing together significant answers; thus forcing us to rely on 
other, more current doctrine as our starting point for further development of swarming 
concepts.  With this publication, this concludes the doctrinal publications reviewed for 
this paper.  In brief, our capstone doctrinal publications set the right environment to 
Closest point to that of Swarm 
Concepts 
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develop swarming concepts and swarm tactics.  Our current warfighting and reference 
publications fall far short with few exceptions on providing swarm tactics for the offense 
and defense.  As we transition to the warfighting experiments, one would hope that these 
evolutions in advanced warfighting TTPs will help validate the requirement for swarming 
concepts to fill the doctrinal void. 
7. Doctrinal Summary 
The preceding review of relevant doctrinal publications reveals an overall void in 
the doctrinal foundation for training, educating, equipping and employing our forces 
against adversaries that may employ swarm tactics.  Furthermore, while the doctrine does 
provide some relevant TTPs which may prove effective in defending our forces against 
the swarm, the doctrinal writers have largely ignored the tremendous asymmetrical 
advantage that swarm tactics can give the trained and equipped force that uses them.  
This doctrinal review has shown that links to swarming concepts and swarm tactics can 
be drawn from certain aspects of patrolling and defensive formations presented in several 
of the publications.  This review has also identified numerous problems with the doctrinal 
publications that go beyond the scope of this study, such as excessive age and divergence 
from maneuver warfare.  By taking a critical look at this doctrine, it clearly identifies 
many outdated TTPs that are irrelevant in today’s combat operations and incompatible 
with the Corps warfighting philosophy.  With so many doctrinal deficiencies, the Marine 
Corps should look at concepts and TTPs that are relevant to the modern battlespace and 
take into account swarming concepts?  The next section on warfighting experiments 
looks at the Corps’ progress in this, by conducting advanced warfighting experiments. 
C. WARFIGHTING EXPERIMENTS 
The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) is the Corps’ future concept 
experimentation organization.  Since its creation in the late 1990s, the MCWL has 
conducted experiments which have looked at future warfighting concepts as well as 
swarming concepts and TTPs.  The latest concept, distributed operations (DOs), has 
become one of the MCWL’s most significant focus areas.  Since the Marine Corps has 
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asserted that DO is not swarming, which we discussed briefly in Chapter One, specific 
DO experiments are omitted from this chapter even though they add depth and 
effectiveness to the DO concept during implementation. 181  DO will be discussed again 
briefly in the final chapter of this thesis.  The focus of this section remains to look at 
swarm-like concepts and TTPs that were part of the Hunter Warrior Advanced 
Warfighting Experiment (AWE), Urban Warrior AWE and Project Metropolis Battalion 
Level Experiment (BLE).  We’ll first examine the Hunter Warrior AWE.  Since it is a 
known fact that the MCWL has abandoned the experimentation of swarming concepts, 
our concern is not why, but which swarm tactics and concepts were successful and if they 
could fill in our doctrinal voids. 
1. Hunter Warrior 
The Hunter Warrior AWE took place from 1-12 March 1997 at the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Training Center at 29 Palms, California, with forces 
located also at the Marine Corps Base at Camp Pendleton and Marine Corps Air Station 
in Yuma, Arizona.182  The experiment’s hypothesis was “Can we significantly extend the 
area of influence of a modest forward afloat expeditionary force, and also significantly 
increase its effectiveness within that expanded area of influence?”183  The AWE had 
three objective areas.  They were: 
• “Dispersed, non-contiguous battlespace operations: operations by 
dispersed air, ground, and naval forces in which there is no traditional 
front line of troops.  In particular, forces on the ground were not 
contiguous, but were dispersed throughout the battlefield. 
• Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) in 
a single battle. 
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• Enhanced fires and targeting, to enable combat power to be brought to 
bear on the enemy quickly and effectively.”184 
One of the concepts evaluated during Hunter Warrior was the concept of using 
Long Range Contact Patrols (LRCPs) to find enemy forces, and direct fires upon the 
targets without the compromise of their position or engaging in direct action with the 
enemy.185  These LRCPs were controlled by a simulated MAGTF afloat using advanced 
technology.  The important point here is not to rehash the successes and disappointments 
resulting from the experiment, but to try and grasp some concepts relevant to swarming 
and see if they help us fill some doctrinal void. 
Despite the negative rhetoric from numerous individuals I interviewed concerning 
Hunter Warrior, I think that this LOE did show several important points related to our 
ability to swarm the enemy by fires.  The following observations and conclusions bolster 
this position: 
• Command and Control 
• “The operations center was able to keep track of the multiple 
LRCPs across the nonlinear battlefield. 
• The combination of sensors, from the use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) to the Marines in the LRCPs, kept the enemy 
under constant observation. 
• LRCPs were an important part of the Special MAGTF 
(SPMAGTF) reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. 
• LRCPs submitted more detection-related messages than any other 
single source. 
• LRCP detection messages correlated to fire missions about as often 
as any other source. 
• LRCP-initiated tracks, that when fired on, were hit as often as any 
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• Maneuver and Fires 
• Basic Marines (not “hand-picked”) were trained to accomplish 
LRCP missions beyond “normal” infantry capabilities. 
• Squads operated autonomously. 
• They were able to operate without being detected. 
• They contributed significantly to the SPMAGTF picture. 
• Once on the ground, most LRCPs were able to survive while 
accomplishing their missions (Opposing Force (OpFor) found only 
1). 
• SPMAGTF was able to coordinate combined fires attacks, using 
several different combinations of sequential and massed fires, and 
dissimilar, dispersed fires assets. 
• Logistics 
• Logistics caches were critical to supporting small dispersed units 
across a large nonlinear battlefield.”186 
In the end, the MCWL staff agreed that they “could extend the area of influence 
of a forward afloat expeditionary force and increase its effectiveness within that enlarged 
area of influence using the technologies, training and TTPs”187 used in the experiment.  It 
is ironic that a well-networked force of little more than 50 Marines from a battalion 
landing team (BLT) held off a reinforced regimental combat team (RCT), yet most of the 
personnel at the MCWL want everyone to forget about Hunter Warrior.  I believe this 
experiment validated that if properly trained and equipped, Marines assigned to infantry 
battalions can conduct offensive swarm by fire operations against conventionally armed 
and organized adversaries.  Additionally, the experiment showed that through a combined 
approach (sensors, UAVs and LRCPs), that the enemy was swarmed by friendly ‘eyes’ 
(sensors) and had to adapt in order to not be targeted.188 
The Marines in the LRCPs and the operations center demonstrated that relatively 
junior Marines (noncommissioned officers (NCOs)) can lead autonomous teams in 
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nonlinear operations across a non-contiguous battlespace.  While this might sound 
strangely like DO, the MCWL would assert it is not.  However, this experiment did more 
to advance swarm tactics and swarming concepts than any other military warfighting 
exercise up to that time.  The Urban Warrior AWE and Project Metropolis BLE were to 
build upon the lessons of Hunter Warrior, but did they further progress in the swarming 
concepts which would lead us to doctrinal solutions? 
2. Urban Warrior and Project Metropolis 
The Urban Warrior AWE and subsequent Project Metropolis BLE took place 
over several years, starting in January 1999.  These experiments did build upon lessons 
learned from Hunter Warrior, while evaluating and experimenting with new TTPs and 
technologies to improve the ability of the MAGTF to fight more effectively and 
efficiently in the urban battlespace.  Of all the experiments conducted after Hunter 
Warrior, the Urban Warrior AWE and the Project Metropolis BLE subtitle “The 
Combined Arms Team in MOUT”189 are the most relevant to swarming concepts.  The 
Urban Warrior AWE will be covered first. 
The Urban Warrior AWE took the fight into a real city for the first time, creating 
an environment not before experienced in a training exercise.  The experiment “was 
conducted in Monterey and the San Francisco Bay area from 12-18 March 1999.”190  It 
looked at the ability of “a forward afloat force to execute simultaneous, non-contiguous 
operations in both the extended and constrained battlespace.”191  The foundations of the 
AWE were a reflection of observations of urban combat and that we had to do it better.192  
Gangle’s article on the foundations of the Urban Warrior AWE paint a picture of 
something building upon the swarm concepts of Hunter Warrior and the Chechen swarm 
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success in Chechnya.193  Indeed, the description of the “Urban Swarm” described by 
Gangle is very close to that of Arquilla’s, Ronfeldt’s and Edwards’s.194  Of concern here 
is if those plans made it to execution and how successful or unsuccessful they were.  
While one of the objectives looked at “penetrating and operating in dense urban 
littorals,”195 the actual use of swarming concepts or swarm tactics does not appear 
evident in actual conduct of this experiment.  A hard look at swarming concepts doesn’t 
seem to come to the forefront of any discussions or analysis in the experiments after 
action report.  Urban Warrior did look at an experimental maneuver unit, which was 
really nothing more than a new task organization of a company and its platoons.196  The 
experiments ‘vapor’ concept was not swarming as some of those interviewed by the 
author eluded too or Sean Edwards’s ‘vapor swarm’ but were as the report described a 
concept to “deceive, distract, and frustrate an enemy before attacking.”197  The main 
points to take away from this experiment is that it failed to address any new defensive 
TTPs to enemy swarm tactics, and provided no new offensive TTPs for our forces to use 
swarm tactics against our enemies, despite the planned inclusion of those in the 
foundations of the experiment.198  Furthermore, the task organization and TTP 
experiments in Urban Warrior failed to decrease the casualty rate in urban combat.199 
Whereas Urban Warrior failed to address the swarm and capitalize off the LRCPs 
success in the Hunter Warrior AWE, Project Metropolis’ BLE supposedly did. 
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The Project Metropolis BLE that was conducted from 22 January to 9 February 
2001 experimented with ‘Urban Swarm’ tactics.200  The report states that “no specific 
experimentation was conducted with the Swarm tactic,” but that “limited patrolling was 
conducted using infantry/armor teams.”201  So if they did not experiment with swarm 
tactics, then why is this particular combined arms patrolling TTP called the ‘Urban 
Swarm’?  The answer is that the MCWL personnel labeled the tactic’s saturation of an 
area by two or more patrols of infantry squads reinforced with a tank as swarming when 
it was not.  The idea was to send out multiple patrols from company and platoon patrol 
bases to dislodge the enemy from buildings and run him into friendly strong points where 
he could be defeated, negating the requirement to sweep every building along a patrol 
route.202  Compared to the definitions of swarming considered in this paper, the swarm 
tactics used during the BLE fall short of fulfilling a true experiment of our definition of 
what would be an offensive swarm.  Additionally from this experiment’s report, they 
only used their ‘Urban Swarm’ concept during one day during the experiment.203  This is 
a far cry from taking a notional doctrinal concept, and running it through a full gamut of 
evaluations necessary to either adopt or abandon a warfighting concept which historically 
has worked so well for others.  At this point, a summary of how swarming concepts really 
have prevailed during the MCWL experimentations to date is suitable. 
3. MCWL Experimentation Summary 
This section has reviewed the three most relevant MCWL experiments which had 
the potential to address the doctrinal void created by the recognition of swarming 
concepts and swarm tactics.  Clearly, the Urban Warrior LOE contributed the least 
towards providing doctrinal solutions.  Given that extending operations in the non-
continuous battlespace was an experimental objective, the lack of conducting nonlinear 
operations complicated the ability for friendly forces to inject swarm tactics into the 
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experiment.  The BLE experiment as part of Project Metropolis in 2001 mentioned 
swarm tactics, and even conducted an ‘Urban Swarm’ experiment, but only in the context 
of saturating an area with forces and hoping to run the enemy into a trap.  Any 
association with swarming concepts and swarm tactics as used in this paper is a 
disappointment.  Oddly enough, the Hunter Warrior AWE, which actually was the first 
experiment of its kind for the MCWL, developed the type of concepts required to develop 
doctrinal solutions in swarming.  This experiment did show that the MAGTF could 
organize, train, equip and employ small teams of infantry Marines and have them execute 
limited swarm tactics against a first rate conventional enemy.  The LRCPs and the ‘Urban 
Swarm’ concepts that the MCWL has experimented with provided evidence that 
swarming concepts are valid and increase the flexibility and lethality of the MAGTF. 
D. CONCLUSION 
From this review of Marine Corps doctrinal publications and MCWL 
experiments, there are several conclusions that we can come to.  The first is that Marine 
Corps doctrine does not take into account swarm tactics or swarming concepts in general, 
but the Corps’ capstone doctrine does set the right conditions for swarming concepts to 
be developed.  That some defensive TTPs may offer protection from and the ability to 
repel the swarm when used against us is more of an accident than something doctrinal 
writers contemplated.  Patrolling seems to be a common base from which our forces 
could train and employ swarm tactics against our enemies, but the current focus of our 
tactics remains on the single decisive engagement to defeat the enemy by fire and 
maneuver.  The second point with respect to doctrinal voids is that we have much work to 
do in order to fill this tremendous gap that, if filled, could give our forces an asymmetric 
advantage on the offensive and increased survivability when defending against swarm 
tactics.  Third, a single ray of validation of swarming concepts occurred during one 
MCWL experiment.  During Hunter Warrior, the concept of LRCPs and their ability to 
swarm fires upon our adversaries did work, laying ground for a conceptual model of how 
successful swarm tactics could be.  In looking back at the two fundamental requirements 
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provided in the introduction, these LRCPs could in fact hit an enemy from any direction 
with fires and were part of the “sensory organization.”   
So where does all this leave us?  The short answer is that we are still left with a 
large doctrinal void.  Armed with the knowledge of doctrinal gaps and warfighting 
experiment after action reports, the Marine Corps should work towards filling this 
doctrinal void.  Through concept development and experimentation, swarm tactics can be 
validated in both offensive and defensive doctrine for the Marine Corps.  This can give us 
another edge against asymmetric enemies while conducting nonlinear dispersed 
operations on a non-contiguous battlefield. 
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Armed with new lessons learned and perspectives from the Russian and Chechen 
sides of the Chechen Wars and a critical review of Marine Corps doctrinal publications in 
light of swarming concepts and swarm tactics, we need to finalize our research and 
answer the thesis question and the remaining research question.  Is there potential to 
develop doctrinal concepts of swarming?  Can we [U.S. forces, but more specifically, 
Marine forces] incorporate swarm tactics into our doctrine for use in the offense and 
defense without drastic changes to organization, command, control and communications 
(C3), training, and logistics?  The first thing required is to look back at this puzzle that 
has been created, and see where we really stand in relation to swarm tactics, doctrinal 
voids and experimentation.  Next, we need to provide a preliminary “test of the water” 
towards a swarming doctrine.  The Marine Corps’ DO concept requires additional 
clarification and despite the rhetoric, and this paper would be incomplete without 
examining if its relevancy to swarming is more than what we are led to believe.   
B. THE CHECHEN WARS REVISITED 
In Chapter II , we took key variables such as C3, organization, doctrine and 
training and logistics provide additional insight to the Chechen Wars.  The Chechen 
perspective reinforces some principles of swarming concepts first captured by Arquilla, 
Ronfeldt and Edwards in their publications.  The Russian perspective provided additional 
lessons learned to the extensive list that has been distributed in many publications over 
the years.  But in relation to the research question at stake and in light of its effect on U.S. 
forces, we need to recall key lessons from the Chechen Wars. 
1.  You cannot ignore the concept of swarming and the use of swarm tactics as a 
potential asymmetric advantage. 
2.  Attacking an urban area is difficult, and it is exponentially more difficult if 
your adversary can successfully employ swarm tactics. 
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3.  Defending an urban area is difficult if your adversary can successfully 
infiltrate the urban area and employ swarm tactics. 
4.  Force ratios that resulted in success for the Russians in the first battle for 
Grozny was essentially 2:1.  In the second battle for Grozny, the Russians enjoyed at 3-
4:1 force advantage over the Chechens, but were still forced to surrender the city.  In the 
third battle for Grozny, the Russians attacked with more than a 30:1 force ratio, which 
resulted in their eventual seizure of the city after a very hard fight.204  The lesson from 
this is that you must have an overwhelming force advantage to seize and hold a city 
against a swarm tactics. 
5.  While learning from the Russian experience in Grozny is imperative, the U.S. 
cannot imitate the Russian’s use of force and tactics less it lose its high level of status and 
trust in the American public. 
6.  An examination of our warfighting doctrine must include swarming concepts 
and swarm tactics.  Gaps identified in doctrine must be addressed in TTPs or we have 
failed to really learn from the Russian experience in Chechnya. 
Acknowledging these additional lessons, prepares us to move onto what we have 
gained from the doctrinal review in Chapter Three.   
C. THE DOCTRINAL VOID 
Chapter III really contributes more than one part to this thesis, thus why it 
precedes the conclusion.  First, does the Marine Corps have the doctrinal framework 
necessary to advocate swarming concepts and swarm tactics?  The short answer to this is 
yes it does.  The Marine Corps’ capstone doctrinal publications recognize key top level 
variables and conditions that are conducive to swarming.  Swarm tactics thrive in 
nonlinear operations conducted within the non-contiguous battlespace.  Well-trained, 
educated and empowered junior leaders, mission type orders, clear commander’s intent, 
and solid networked communications are all things that enable swarm units to operate 
effectively under various conditions.  We saw this environment established in every 
MCDP that was reviewed here.   
The next question asked is if swarming concepts and swarm tactics expose 
doctrinal voids.  Our doctrinal problems begin with a departure from the capstone 
                                                 
204 Sean Edwards, Swarming and the Future of War, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 274-278. 
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publications; meaning that of warfighting and reference publications.  With very few 
exceptions, swarming concepts and swarm tactics reveal doctrinal gaps in every single 
publication.  While those few exceptions are not specifically related to swarming, they do 
provide venues that make the recognition and integration of swarm tactics all the easier.  
The swarming concept challenge to our publications has in fact identified a valid 
doctrinal void that can be filled by developing swarming concepts that translate into 
swarm tactics for use by our forces in the offensive and defensive.  Of course, one of the 
ways you discover and mature new concepts and TTPs is through experimentation. 
D. MCWL EXPERIMENTS AND DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS 
The MCWL’s experiments that were reviewed here showed many interesting 
things.  First, Hunter Warrior showed that basic Marines and NCOs could be trained and 
equipped to conduct swarm tactics successfully.  This is important, as the enabling 
capabilities for DO are rooted in the training, education, and empowerment of Marine 
NCOs, not in developing new warfighting TTPs.  In the words of Col. Goulding,  
The DO concept was never designed to create “DO squads,” “DO 
platoons,” or even “DO battalions.”  Rather, it was designed to train man, 
and equip Marines to be more lethal, agile, and survivable on an 
increasingly distributed battlefield…Neither the concept nor the 
experimentation that supported it ever sought to create ersatz 
reconnaissance teams or independently operating squads trained to engage 
our Nation’s enemies with binoculars and indirect fire.205 
Yet, DO have reinforced the training and education lessons we learned at Hunter 
Warrior, other MCWL experiments and combat operations in OEF and OIF.  That is our 
NCOs are capable of leading their Marine without an officer standing over them.  They 
are capable of understanding and executing mission orders with commander’s intent.  
Our NCOs today understand high technology tools that enable them to be more capable 
than simply directing fire team rushes.  While Hunter Warrior did specifically look at 
swarming and provided us what I argue is the impetus for exploring swarming further, 
Urban Warrior and Project Metropolis failed to execute the swarming concepts that were 
                                                 
205 Vincent J. Goulding, “DO:  More than Two Words,” Marine Corps Gazette, 92, 4, April 2008, 78. 
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preplanned during both of the AWEs.  Unfortunately, MCWL experimentation to develop 
any type of swarming concepts that would fill our newly identified doctrinal voids died 
long before the DO concept matured.  This does not mean that DO is completely useless 
to the concept of swarming.  If fact, it is vital. 
Going back to our definitions of swarming and BGen. Schmidle’s description of 
the DO concept, knowing what we have learned thus far, one can argue that DO, by 
virtue of what it has done for the infantry battalions, has established optimal conditions 
for further experimentation in swarming concepts.  This is not in an effort to completely 
replace traditional infantry battalion roles, but as in DO, to give the battalions “additional 
capabilities”206 to present asymmetric combat power on the dispersed, nonlinear, non-
contiguous battlespace.  Furthermore, should experimentation show further utility for 
swarming concepts, the construct of doctrinal concepts and TTPs would be the next step.  
Before we affirm the potential to develop doctrinal swarming concepts and conclude the 
answer to the final research question, it would be helpful to present the discussion in a 
manner consistent with the question and our case study variables. 
E. PUTTING IT TOGETHER 
In order to strengthen this argument for swarming doctrinal concepts, we need to 
place this argument into the context of service realities.  Keeping with the Marine Corps-
centric focus of this thesis, the following discussion continues with that theme.  The 
Marine Corps has been America’s premier expeditionary force-in-readiness, and has 
enjoyed a most respected place in the lore of military fighting organizations.  Any 
concept and resulting warfighting doctrine must increase the Corps effectiveness, 
efficiency and lethality or face a quick death in the halls of service-level staff offices.  So 
what do we know? 
•  We have already set precedents for swarming’s success in the Chechen 
wars.   
• We have identified that the Corps capstone doctrinal publications do set 
the top-level conditions for swarming.   
                                                 
206 Vincent J. Goulding Jr., “DO:  More than Two Words,” Marine Corps Gazette, 91, 2, February 
2007, 51. 
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• We have identified that current warfighting doctrine does have substantial 
gaps that swarming can fill.   
• We have shown in a brief warfighting experiment that our Marines can 
employ swarm tactics.   
• We have created a complementary bridge between swarming concepts and 
the Corps’ DO concept.   
Knowing all this, do we know enough to develop a warfighting concept and build 
an experimentation plan?  The answer is yes, we do. 
F. TOWARDS DOCTRINAL SWARMING CONCEPTS 
In order to develop swarming concepts and an experimentation plan, a 
comprehensive approach based on historical uses of and lessons from the use of swarm 
tactics, Dr. Edwards’s theory of swarming, and the targeting of doctrinal voids provides a 
good starting point.  The theory, literature and after actions provide everything needed to 
draft conceptual documents on swarming and swarm tactic vignettes.  Building upon the 
lessons from Hunter Warrior and other pre-DO MCWL experiments can provide 
baselines to construct further experimentation.  Truly capitalizing the work from Hunter 
Warrior into more advanced swarm TTPs is not new.  LtCol Jon Hoffman argued that the 
Hunter Warrior AWE did not go far enough, and provided well-articulated arguments for 
further developing the concepts in the AWE.207  Within that concept, and crucial for 
Marine Corps’ acceptance, would be the description of organizational requirements, 
training and education requirements, and additional equipment required to enable the 
concept to mature. 
1. Organization 
Organizationally, the same baseline for swarming concepts is already there; the 
Marine Corps rifle squad and platoon.  The Marine Corps doesn’t need to reorganize its 
                                                 
207 Jon. T. Hoffman, “Getting the Hunt into Hunter Warrior,” Marine Corps Gazette, 82, 12, 
December 1998, 55-59.  LtCol Hoffman’s article provides the rebuttal to an earlier Gazette article which 
heavily criticized Hunter Warrior.  Hoffman’s article argued that the experiments should have continued, 
to include increasing the size of the LRCPs and having them actually hunt for enemy nodes vice remaining 
stationary and waiting for the enemy to come into our sensor range. 
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infantry battalions to conduct swarming operations or defend against the swarm.  Just as 
in DO, the rifle squad could be at the heart of organizational baselines in swarming 
concepts for executing swarm tactics.  The Chechen’s used small units of various sizes to 
swarm the Russians, but similar sized units could be formed from reinforced squads and 
platoons augmented with snipers and anti-armor weapons.  DO concepts have shown us 
that our NCOs and junior officers have the capacity and maturity to conduct dispersed 
operations.  Likewise, those same NCOs and officers would be able to lead Marines in 
missions which called for the use of swarm tactics.  DO has fermented the training and 
education of those NCOs. 
2. Training and Education 
Additional training time sends chills down manpower planner’s spines.  It places 
stress on the training and education establishments, who are already stuffing 19 pounds of 
stuff in the ten pound bag.  However, the Marine Corps approach to DO has laid a 
foundation in training and education that produces Marines fully capable of executing 
swarm tactics.  Under the DO concept, all corporal fire team leaders should attend the 
Tactical Small Unit Leaders Course (TSULC).  Similarly, all sergeant squad leaders 
should attend the Infantry Squad Leaders Course (ISLC).  Staff sergeants and senior 
sergeants who will be platoon sergeants attend the Infantry Unit Leaders Course (IULC).  
These courses were either created or revamped under the DO concept.  Before DO, there 
was a short Corporal’s Course, a Squad Leaders Course and then the basic grade related 
professional education.  The DO concept has produced training packages which truly 
prepare these NCOs and staff sergeants for their leadership roles in today’s dispersed, 
nonlinear operations.  Ensuring that NCOs receive the same training developed for DO 
facilitates follow-on training with swarm TTPs.  Just as many of our squad leaders are 
getting qualified to call in and provide terminal guidance for close air support for current 
combat operations, the same would be required to execute swarm tactics.  Having 
established that we have the organization, C2, training and education and all the tools to 
build the doctrinal concept, are the technology for communications and logistical 
methods of sustainment for swarming on par with the rest? 
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3. Communications and Logistics 
With all the advances in communications technologies for both voice and data, 
problems that we faced in earlier warfighting experiments have been solved.  The 
communications suite that is being fielded to support DO is a suitable venue for the 
experimentation of swarming concepts and swarm tactics in a variety of terrain, be it 
urban, jungle or desert.  The long pole in the swarming tent may not be communications, 
as it was just ten years ago.  The challenge today is logistics resupply to the swarm force.   
Logistics support to nonlinear dispersed operations on the non-contiguous 
battlefield presents challenges that still need to be solved.  But, as with most concepts, 
logistics resupply is often solved after the concepts adoption, hopefully before the 
concept is used in combat operations.  Yet, if we are able to sustain small sniper teams, or 
the DO battalions that are deployed in combat operations in Afghanistan, solving the 
puzzle for swarm unit’s logistics sustainment is not insurmountable.  Logistics resupply 
to units employing swarm tactics can be via preplanned caches, aerial resupply, or other 
indirect means.  The point is that while logistics sustainment of swarm forces may 
present challenges, there are solutions and alternative methods distinct from the 
traditional logistics tails that support conventional force operations.  Given what we 
know, an answer to our final research question is possible. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The research conducted here and in other scholarly and professional publications, 
coupled with military doctrine and experimentation, all but leads to the conclusion that 
there is potential to develop doctrinal swarming concepts.  This is based on developing 
answers to the three research questions posed in Chapter I.  First, that the Chechen Wars 
did provide additional information and lessons learned in relation to not only the war in 
general, but to this thesis’ independent variables, regarding the use of swarm tactics.  
Second, reviewing doctrine and warfighting experiments has confirmed the existence of 
doctrinal void in the area of swarm tactics, which implies a need to construct doctrinal 
swarming concepts, engage in experimentation, and promulgate swarm TTPs in doctrine 
and training.  Finally, with the implementation of the DO concept, our knowledge from 
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the first two research questions and previous scholarly research on swarming, a potential 
future swarming doctrine concept foundation is set.  This would allow Marines and other 
forces to employ swarm tactics offensively and defend against and repulse enemy 
swarms.  The only thing left for us to do is “do it.” 
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